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ABSTRACT 
 
The EUPM and EUFOR Althea missions 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
an evaluation. 
 
Ewa Mączyńska 
 
 
The political changes in Europe and the shift in the world’s balance of power brought 
about by the collapse of the Soviet Union forced the European Union in the early 1990’s to 
redefine the possible role it wanted to play in the international arena. From being an organiza-
tion focused mostly on economic cooperation, the European Union quickly transformed itself 
into a player interested also in the security realm.  The first place where the EU attempted to 
prove itself as a new crisis management power was post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina, a country 
that needed physical, political and social reconstruction. As a result in 2003 Brussels launched 
its first-ever civilian crisis management mission, the European Union’s Police Mission in 
Bosnia – Herzegovina (EUPM). It was quickly supplemented by the military crisis manage-
ment mission – EUFOR Althea, launched in 2004.  
This study evaluates the successes and failures of the EU’s crisis management mis-
sions in Bosnia with a special emphasis on their impact on Bosnian social and political life. It 
argues that when deploying its police officers on the ground Brussels was not ready to handle 
the complex problems of the country. As a result the EU failed to provide Bosnia with the 
best possible assistance with its transition into a sustainable country. The shortcomings of the 
mission exposed the weaknesses of the EU and consequently undermined its role as a power 
able to help to resolve Bosnia’s political deadlock and hindered cooperation between Brussels 
and Sarajevo.  
Fortunately, the military component of the EU’s crisis management in Bosnia proved 
to be much more successful than the civilian one.  EUFOR Althea was able to secure the situ-
ation in the country and prevented the possible outbreak of renewed violence. On the other 
hand, it can be argued that much of its success was due to the limited scope of its tasks and 
good coordination with the previous NATO mission. Moreover, the relationship between Al-
thea and EUPM left much to be desired. Whereas for Brussels the shortcomings of the mis-
sion served as a lesson for further improvement, they proved to be fatal for Bosnia’s political 
life. Thus, although the EU may have learned how to conduct crisis management missions, it 
has yet to learn how to assist Bosnia with resolving its problems.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In 1991, in the face of the War in the Persian Gulf, Belgian Foreign Minister, Mark 
Eyskens, sarcastically recapitulated the European Community's significance on the 
international arena by saying: “Europe is an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military 
worm.”1 Much has changed since then, both in terms of the European Union's internal and 
external policy as well as its role as an international actor. The European Community 
developed into the European Union, grew from 12 member states that signed the Maastricht 
treaty into 27 member states that ratified the Lisbon Treaty, and shifted from being a “purely 
civilian actor” into one with not only civilian but also military ambitions.2 One of the most 
significant demonstrations of this shift is the development of the Common Security and 
Defense Policy (CSDP) which “empowers the EU to respond proactively to international 
crises through a broad mix of civilian and military crisis management and conflict prevention 
operations.”3 By emphasizing a need to develop both civilian and military tools in order to 
manage and prevent conflicts, the EU not only suggests that it is ready for new challenges that 
require “hard power” but most importantly it underlines its holistic approach to unstable 
regions. As Javier Solana stated in 2009: “this is the European way of doing things: a 
comprehensive approach to the crisis prevention and crisis management; a large and 
diversified tool box; a rapid response capability; playing our role as a global actor.”4 
                                                 
1
 Craig R Whitney, “War in The Gulf: Europe;  Gulf Fighting Shatters Europeans' Fragile Unity”, The New York 
Times, January 25, 1991, accessed April 01, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/25/world/war-in-the-gulf-
europe-gulf-fighting-shatters-europeans-fragile-unity.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm 
2
 Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defense Policy in the European Union, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, 
p.2. 
3
 Before the Lisbon treaty the Common Security and Defense Policy  was known as an European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP); Delegation of the European Union to the United States, “The EU’s Common Security 
and Defense Policy Contributing to Peace and Security Worldwide”, EU Focus, September 2011, Accessed 
March 30, 2012. http://www.eurunion.org/eu/EU-Focus-and-EU-Insight/EU-Focus-and-EU-Insight.html 
4
 Javier Solana, Address by the High Representative for the Common Foreign Policy, Javier Solana, to the 
10 
 
The very first place were the EU was able to play its new role as a global actor and to 
prove itself as a new civil-military (civ-mil) power was Bosnia – Herzegovina.5 In 2003 
Brussels launched in Bosnia its very first CSDP operation – a police mission, European Union 
Police Mission, EUMP, that was a successor to the United Nations' International Police Task 
Force (IPTF). A year later, in December 2004, the EU took over the responsibilities of 
overseeing military implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) from NATO's 
Stabilization Force (SFOR) forces and deployed its own military mission – European Union 
Force, EUFOR Althea. By engaging both its civilian and military policies and instruments, the 
EU turned Bosnia into a “trailblazer and a guinea pig” of the coherent concept of crisis 
management.
6
 The main goal of this paper will be to evaluate the efficiency of the EU's crisis 
management operations in Bosnia and analyze the co-ordination between them. 
This evaluation is important for several reasons. First of all, as mentioned before, 
Bosnia was the first country were the EU was able to prove itself as a civ-mil power; thus 
analyses of the main problems and challenges on the ground can serve as a lesson for the 
future operations. As Chris Patten clearly stated in 2001 “whether we succeed or not [in the 
Balkans] is a key test of our nascent common foreign and security policy, our ability to project 
stability beyond our borders and into our immediate neighborhood.”7 This approach reveals 
also the symbolical meaning of the EU's intervention in Bosnia. Although Jacques Poos 
already in 1991 claimed that “the hour of Europe” had finally come, the next eleven years 
could not prove him more wrong. Brussels was not only unable to successfully react to the 
war in the Balkans that took place between 1992-1995, but was also unprepared to take over 
                                                                                                                                                        
European Parliament, Brussels,18 Febuary 2009, Doc. S045/09. 
5
Hereinafter BiH or simply Bosnia. 
6
Giovanni Grevi, Helly Damien, Keohane Daniel, eds., European Security and Defense Policy, The First Ten 
Years (1999 - 2009), Paris EU Institute for Security Studies, 2010. Accessed on-line March 25, 2012. 
www.iss.europa.eu. 
7
Chris Patten, EU strategy in the Balkans, speech to the International Crisis Group, 10 July 2001, Brussels. 
Accessed on-line March 20, 2012. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/01/338&format=HTML&aged=0&language
=EN&guiLanguage=en 
11 
 
responsibilities for stabilizing the region immediately after the conflict. Brussels’ inability to 
act as a regional power was also proven by Kosovo conflict in 1999. It was therefore “the 
crises in the Balkans, which dominated the entire decade of the 1990s (that) created a 
powerful exogenous stimulus behind ESDP”.8 The final decision to take over the civilian and 
military missions from the UN and NATO in 2003 and 2004 in Bosnia was for the EU a 
symbolical test that that was supposed to reveal whether Brussels was ready to act as a 
regional power. The significance of this test was emphasized by Solana who said just before 
the EU established its EUMP mission in Bosnia: “I make no apology for concentrating on the 
Balkans. They are on our doorstep. The security of Europe depends on stability in the 
Balkans. They are also a test-case for Europe’s enhanced Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. Nowhere more than in the Balkans is the EU expected to deliver.’9 
The crisis management operations in Bosnia also have a significant meaning due to 
their interrelationship with the EU enlargement policy.
10
 As Stefano Recchia stated in 2007: 
“the EU involvement in BiH today is unique not only with regard to the level of political, 
military and economic commitment that have been forthcoming. (…) BiH today advanced 
beyond the stage of immediate post-war recovery and has begun its path towards European 
Integration.”11 And he later concluded that the EU's “long term strategic objectives consist in 
promoting a stable, viable and democratic Bosnia that will be able to join the EU as a full 
member.”12 Thus, the EUMP and EUFOR missions serve not only the purpose of “supporting 
the process of reconstruction of the country both in political and psychical sense”, as Ana J. 
Juncos describes the main goal of a crisis management, but also to draw BiH closer to 
                                                 
8
Howorth, Security and Defence Policy..., p. 55. 
9
Javier Solana, Europe: Security in the Twenty – First Century, The Olof Palme Memorial Lecture, 20 June 2001, 
Stockholm. Accessed on-line March 05, 2012. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/discours/ACF332.htm 
10As Christopher J. Bickerton writes “Foreign and security policy (…) needs to be seen as the next phase in 
European integration.” Christopher J. Bickerton, European Union Foreign Policy: From Effectivness to 
Funcionality, (New York: Palgrave Macmilan, 2010), p. 6. 
11Stefano Recchia, “Beyond International Trusteeship: EU Peace building in Bosnia Herzegovina”,  Occasional 
Paper 66, EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS),  ( February, 2007), p. 24. 
12
Ibid, p. 24. 
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Europe.
13
 They can serve therefore as lenses through which one can analyze the general 
ability of the EU to develop a coherent and holistic foreign policy towards its neighborhood. 
This significance of the EU presence in BiH is stated clearly in the Comprehensive Policy for 
BiH, which reads that “while the ultimate objective of this policy is to make Bosnia - 
Herzegovina an integral part of the European Union, the process contributes to building 
security in our neighborhood: one of three strategic objectives for the Union identified in the 
EU Security Strategy.”14 
The last thing that makes the evaluation of EUMP and EUFOR missions especially 
important is the fact that EUFOR Althea is still ongoing and EUPM, after having its mandate 
extended several times, was only recently terminated.
15
 Therefore, on the one hand, their 
analysis can serve as an illustration of the evolution the EU crisis management concept went 
through due to “on the ground” challenges. On the other hand, the analysis of the mission's 
successes and failures will reveal the main problems contemporary Bosnia faces and thus will 
allow us to better understand the main challenges the EU must face in order to achieve one of 
its main goals: to help Bosnia to became a sustainable and stable country. 
The EU's need to turn Bosnia into a country that would be able to fulfill Brussels 
requirements for integration is closely related to the question of how to judge the EU's crisis 
management. An exhaustive evaluation of the EU's crisis management missions, regardless of 
the country they are deployed in, requires a good understanding of the region. After all, the 
goal of the crisis management is not only to build the EU position as an global player, but 
most notably, “developing the civilian dimension is part of the EU’s overall approach in using 
civilian and military means to respond coherently to the whole spectrum of crisis management 
                                                 
13
 Ana E. Juncos, “The EU's post – Conflict Intervention in Bosnia and Hercegovina: (re)integrating the Balkans 
and/or (re)Inventing the EU?” Southeast European Politics, vol. VI, no. 2, November 2005, p. 101. 
14
European Council, European Security Strategy – Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Comprehensive Policy, Brussels, 
17-18 June 2004. 
15
 The mission officially ended on June 30 2012. It was so far the longest crisis management mission ever 
launched by the European Union. 
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tasks such as conflict prevention, peacekeeping and tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilization.”16 In other words, as 
Annemarie Peen Rodt points out, in order to evaluate the success of a crisis management 
mission it is necessary to analyze both its “internal success [which] refers to an operation, 
which is successful from the point of view of the EU (and) external success, [which] indicates 
a positive impact on the conflict situation on the ground. Both of these aspects of success are 
necessary for an operation to be an overall success.”17 Yet, while there is quite a substantial 
number of studies devoted to analyzing the “internal success” of the crisis management 
missions and to presenting the evolution of the crisis management concept there is still a lack 
of focused case studies that elaborate the impact of the mission for the country in which it was 
launched. Thus this thesis will try to fill this void by analyzing crisis management in Bosnia 
from the perspective of both external and internal success. 
The first chapter of this thesis will present a short history of the development of the 
EU's CFSP with a special emphasis on presenting EU's crisis management concept, its main 
goals, means, and tools. It will also focus on presenting the main problems of BiH. The 
second chapter will be devoted to analyzing EUMP police mission in Bosnia. It will take 
under the scrutiny its main goals and achievements. It will present its main shortcomings and 
their impact on the Bosnian society. The third chapter will focus on the EUFOR military 
mission. It will not only analyze the mission itself but it will also provide a comparison 
between EUFOR Althea and EUPM pointing out the main differences between European 
Union’s military and civilian crisis management mission.  It will be followed by a summary. 
 
 
                                                 
16
 The Council of The European Union, Civilian Headline Goal 2008, EU Doc. 15863/04, Brussels, December 7, 
2004, p. 2. 
17
 Annamarie Peen Rodt, EU Performance in Military Conflict Management, Paper presented at the EUSA 
Twelfth Biennial International Conference, Boston, Massachusetts, March 3-5, 2011, p. 4. 
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CHAPTER I 
EU’S ROAD TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
 
1.Introduction to the EU crisis management concept 
 
The term “crisis management”, although used repeatedly in the context of the EU's 
military and civilian  external missions, still lacks a clear definition. Steven Blockmans and 
Ramses L. Wessel define “crisis management” as a concept that “refers to the organization, 
regulation, procedural framework and arrangements to contain a crisis and shape its future 
course while resolution is sought.”18 Their definition is based on the Treaty of Maastricht 
(Treaty of The European Union, TEU) and thus, accordingly, makes a distinction between 
conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution. This distinction is common 
among scholars, yet, it seems to be rather a rhetorical one as “the dividing lines between the 
different categories are often blurred in practice.”19 Therefore as Blockmans and Wessel 
conclude, “in the EU context, the notion of 'crisis management' serves as a catch-all phase for 
both military and civilian ESDP operations, whether they are deployed to prevent conflict 
from bursting into crisis, assist in enforcing the peace, keep the peace or build the peace.”20 
Jolyon Howorth broadens this definition by adding that the “management of (…) crisis might 
involve the deployment of diplomatic or economic instruments, the dispatch of police or 
administrative agents, or even the deployment of combat troops.”21 Both EUMP and EUFOR 
mission definitely fit into such a broad definition. On the other hand some of the scholars 
                                                 
18
Steven Blockmans, and Ramses A. Wessel, The European Union Crisis Management: Will the Lisbon Treaty 
Make the EU More Effective?, Cleer Working Papers 1/2009, p. 11. Accessed on-line April 02, 2012, 
http://www.asser.nl/default.aspx?site_id=26&level1=14467&level2=14468 
19
Ibid, p. 11. 
20
Ibid, p. 11. 
21
Howorth, Security and Defence Policy, p. 10. 
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argue that those missions should not be treated as an example of a conflict management due to 
their duration. Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin suggest that “because of its long run-up, 
operation Althea cannot really be described as ‘crisis management’ in the true sense of the 
word.”22 Yet, as there is no real “true sense of the word” crisis management and its definition 
points rather to its goals than its duration this paper will treat EUMP and EUFOR as an 
example of EU's crisis management missions. 
The concept of EU crisis management is further divided into military and civilian 
crisis management concept (CCM). Whereas the military dimension had been an integral part 
of the crisis management concept since it was first developed by the European Community, 
the civilian dimension developed later and for many reasons it is quite difficult to define. 
Maike Kuhn tries to explain it as an “instrument for international actors to help create 
structures and capacities that enable the state to provide for the security and safety of its 
population. It is not a soft option but a fundamental element of building sustainable peace.”23 
Renata Dwan is more skeptical in this regards and writes that civilian crisis management 
“potentially,  denotes any policy or instrument directed at the management of crises that is not 
a military policy or military instrument – a description that raises more questions about the 
definition of 'military' and 'non-military' than it provides answers.”24 Also Agnieszka Nowak 
underlines the fact that because the “CCM potentially comprises multiple stages and multiple 
actors and that there is no agreement on its definition has resulted in some confusion over the 
                                                 
22
  Muriel Asseburg, and Ronja Kempin, “Indtroduction: A systematic Stocktaking of ESDP Missions and 
Operations” in The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence?A Systematic Assessment of 
ESDP Missions and Operations, ed.  Muriel Asseburg, and Ronja Kempin, German Institute for International 
and Security Affairs,  December 14, 2009. Accessed on-line March 20, 2012. http://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/publications/swp-research-papers/swp-research-paper-
detail/article/esdp_missions_an_assessment.html 
23Maike Kuhn, “The System of EU Crisis Management – From Bringing Peace to Establishing Democracy?”, in 
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, ed. Armin von Bogdandy, and Wolfrum Rüdiger Wolfrum, vol 13, 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009.), pp. 253- 254. 
24
 Renata Dwan, Civilian tasks and capabilities in EU operations, paper presented in Berlin, May 2004, p.1. 
Accessed on-line March 26, 2012, http://www.slideshare.net/Nostrad/civilian-tasks-and-capabilities-in-eu-
operations 
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definition of CCM at the EU level.”25 The confusion is also brought about by the fact that the 
EU's idea of a crisis management has “no equivalent in the lexicons of the United Nations, the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or non- European regional 
organizations.”26 On the other hand it is the uniqueness of the concept that EU builds its 
international position on – a position of a civ-mil power. Yet, in order to play its new role 
successfully EU has to be able to make the cooperation between the civilian and military 
aspects fully operational. The case of BiH will enable us to see if EU is really a civ-mil power 
or if it is rather a power that tries to deploy at the same time military and civilian operation. 
 
 
 
2. The development of the EU’s crisis management concept 
 
 The history of the development of the EU's CFSP (that further lead to the 
development of a crisis management concept and helped the EU to define itself as a civ-mil 
power) can be best illustrated by the words of Harold Macmillan, UK prime minister in years 
1957 - 1963. Once asked “by a young journalist what can most easily steer a government off 
its chosen course (he) replied: “Events, dear boy, events!”27 In the case of the European 
Union, it was the events of the late 80's and 90's that dramatically changed European 
politicians' perspective on the future role of the European Community. The first stimulus was 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991. It marked not only the end of the 
cold war, but also the end of an era in which “Europe was, the facto, at the heart of global 
                                                 
25
Agnieszka Nowak ed., “Civilian crisis management:  the EU way”, Chaillot Paper no 90, EU Institute for 
Security Studies, Paris, June 2006. p. 16. Accessed on-line March 17, 2012 http://www.iss.europa.eu/ 
26Maike Kuhn, “The System of EU Crisis Management...” p. 253. 
27
Christopher Hill, and Michael Smith, International relations and the foreign Union, (New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2005), p. 182. 
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geo-strategic reality.”28 With the fall of the Berlin Wall Washington was able to take Europe of 
off of NATO's “security” radar and thus it had no more reason to serve as a guarantor of the 
European security. The period in which Europeans “enjoyed (…) free-riding (which 
effectively reduced their sense of responsibility for security)”29 and were protected by the 
NATO shield ended. 
 The second driver behind the creation of the ESDP was the series of the conflicts that 
erupted in the early 90s. Not only was Europe called a military warm in the face of the Iraqi 
invasion on Kuwait but it was also incapable of handling its own backyard. As Federiga Bindi 
argues, “the war in the former Yugoslavia, which had started in June 1991, is a text book case 
of the failure of European foreign policy.”30 Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, although 
less categorical, are also far from labeling European engagement in the presented conflicts as 
successful. They write that “although WEU carried out some joint European minesweeping 
actions in the Gulf in 1988-90 and monitoring police activities in former Yugoslavia in the 
early 1990s, it did not presume to deliver EU 'collective defense'”.31 
 The events of the late 80s and early 90s forced the leaders of EU to think more 
comprehensively about their role on the global arena and their goals in the field of the foreign 
security. In his commentary to the way Europe responded to the Gulf war Jacques Delors 
stated that “the only option compatible with the complete vision of European union was to 
insert a common security policy into this framework.”32 The first step towards creating a 
coherent EU Common Foreign and Security Policy was signing the Maastricht treaty, which 
established an intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy, which served as the 
second of three pillars that constituted the European Community. As Title I of the Common 
                                                 
28
Howorth, Security and Defence Policy, p.52. 
29
Ibid., p. 16. 
30
Federiga Bidni, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, Assessing Europe's Role in the World, (Brookings 
Institution Press, December 18, 2009), p. 31. 
31
Howorth, Security and Defence policy, p.180. 
32
 Dennis Gyllensporre, “competing and complementary perspectives on the eu as a crisis management actor: An 
Examination of the Common Security and Defence Policy through the Lenses of Idealism and Realism” Phd 
diss, Maastricht University, 2010, p. 19. 
18 
 
Provision stated, one of the goals of the European Community was “to assert its identity on 
the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and 
security policy including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in 
time lead to a common defense.”33  Title V stated clearly that  “The objectives of the common 
foreign and security policy shall be: to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests 
and independence of the Union; to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States 
in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security.”34 
The same year as the WEU's member states worked on the Maastricht Treaty they also 
agreed on signing a Petersberg Declaration that is believed to be the foundation of the future 
EU crisis management. In order to make Western European Union (WEU) more capable of 
acting as a crisis manager in the new conditions of the post-cold war era, the declaration 
stated that “apart from contributing to the common defense in accordance with Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units 
of WEU member States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: - 
humanitarian and rescue tasks; - peace keeping tasks; - tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management, including peacemaking.”35 As Howorth argues, “it implied radical 
transformation of the EU's existing capacity to provide deployable, professional intervention 
forces geared to 'out of area' crisis management.”36 Yet, although the declaration had 
symbolized the change in EU's perception of its global role and the Maastricht treaty did 
establish intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Community 
was still lacking a common European Security and Defense Policy. 
The next step towards shaping European Community's role as an active crisis manager 
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was signing the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 (came into force in 1999). Instead of repeating the 
Maastricht Treaty’s suggestion of “eventual framing of a common defense policy, which 
might in time lead to a common defense” the new treaty stated that “The common foreign and 
security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the union, including the 
progressive framing of a common defense policy, which might lead to a common defense.”37 
It also incorporated the Petersberg Tasks into Title V of the the Maastricht Treaty (by doing so 
it defined EU's possible crisis management missions) and established the office of the High 
Representative for the CSFP. Shortly after its establishment the office was taken by Javier 
Solana, who held it for almost ten years (18 October 1999 to 1 December 2009). Yet, the 
AmsterdamTreaty, although it “amended the Maastricht Treaty with slightly more engaging 
language”, was still far from being revolutionary. 38 
The real revolution in the creation of the European Security and Defense Policy came 
with the meeting between British prime minister, Tony Blair, and the French president, Jacque 
Chirac, on the 3-4 of December 1998. In the French sea town of Saint Malo Tony Blair and 
Jacque Chirac signed the Saint Malo Declaration. The document paved the road towards 
further European cooperation in the field of security by openly calling upon the European 
Council for a “progressive framing of a common defense policy in the framework of CFSP” 
and stating that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by 
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to 
respond to international crises.”39 The EU had crossed the Rubicon. Great Britain, for some 
50 years extremely reluctant towards building European military capacity outside the NATO, 
realized that it was time for Europe to act. London's change of mind was due to the political 
changes brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the lesson learned from the 
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Bosnian war, the strong signals from Washington that in order for NATO to  survive “Europe 
has to get its security act together”, and finally due to the tense atmosphere in Kosovo .40 
Regardless of which of these events was the main impulse, the change brought about was not, 
in Howorth's opinion, “a strategic calculation; it was historical necessity.”41 
The Helsinki European Council meeting in 1999 was another milestone for the 
development of EU crisis management. The European Council adopted “the two Presidency 
progress reports (…) on developing the Union's military and non-military crisis management 
capability as part of a strengthened common European policy on security and defense.”42 The 
military dimension of the crisis management became visible in a decision that “Member 
States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year 
military forces of up to 50,000–60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg 
tasks.”43 (So called Helsinki Headline Goals, HHG) The need to build the civilian dimension 
of the crisis management was underlined by the Council's decision that “a non-military crisis 
management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more effective the 
various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the 
Union and the Member States.”44  
The concept of the civilian crisis management was further developed during the 
European Council meeting at Santa Maria da Feira on 19-20 June, 2000. Whereas in Helsinki 
the EU agreed to be able to deploy military forces at Santa Maria de Feira member states 
“have undertaken that by 2003 they will to be able to provide up to 5,000 police officers for 
international missions across the range of conflict prevention and crisis management 
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operations. Member States have also undertaken to be able to identify and deploy up to 1,000 
police officers within 30 days.”45 During the meeting the EU also addressed four priority 
areas in which the civilian aspects of crisis management should be developed: police, 
strengthening of the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration, and civil protection.
46
 
Furthermore a committee of civilian aspects of crisis management (CIVCOM) was created. 
The development of the Crisis Management, with a special emphasis on the Civilian 
Crisis Management, was sped up by the Swedish Presidency, which during the Gotenborg 
summit in 2001, “introduced a Police action Plan intended to allow the EU to deploy police 
officers rapidly in international operations led by UN or OSCE as well as autonomous 
operations.”47 The Gotenberg project further developed during the first Police Capabilities 
Commitment Conference in November 2001.
48
 A month later, in December 2001, the Laeken 
council announced that by 2003 the  EU's crisis management would be fully established and 
in 2002 Brussels stated that it would be ready to deploy its very first crisis management 
mission (EUMP in Sarajevo) by January 2003. On January 1
st
 2003 the European Union's 
Police mission took over the responsibilities from the UN's IPTF. Brussels' baptism of fire had 
started. A year later, in June 2004 the Helsinki Headline Goal was replaced with a Headline 
Goal 2010 which stated the member states “must be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and 
decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis 
management operations covered by the Treaty of the European Union. ...[Minimum] force 
packages must be militarily effective, credible and coherent and should be broadly based on 
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the Battle groups concept”.49 Within five months from the announcement of the new HG, the 
EU was ready to complement its civilian crisis management mission in BiH with a military 
one – EUFOR Althea.50 
In order to fully comprehend the EU's presence in BiH it is important to understand 
that Brussels decision to engage in the Balkans was strongly connected with the emergence of 
a concept of a 'new world order' and with the EU's sudden realization that in order to secure 
it's neighborhood it needed to develop a comprehensive policy towards it. The idea of a “new 
world order” was brought to life by US president G.W. Bush in 1990 and implied "new ways 
of working with other nations...peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against 
aggression...and just treatment of all peoples."
51
 This somewhat pompous statement was 
quickly picked up by contemporaries and became a theoretical foundation for the EU “crisis 
management concept”. The “Westphalian system” based on the “principle of the sovereignty 
of nation-state”52 was replaced by the new system in which it became acceptable to intervene 
“in the internal affairs of sovereign states in order to safeguard human rights.”53 This 
reconceptualization of international affairs helped the EU to define its “unique role in the 
international security, and in particular its ability to integrate the civilian and military tools 
within a holistic concept of complex twenty – first century security.”54 The first place were 
EU was able to test its holistic approach was BiH. As Juncos states “The EU has deployed in 
BiH the full spectrum of instruments at its disposal, including political tools like conflict 
mediation (EU special representative); economic carrots (humanitarian aid and long term 
economic assistance); and crisis management instruments (police and military mission).” As 
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we can see the crisis management mission in BiH is deep-set in EU comprehensive policy 
towards the country and thus “it goes well beyond crisis management, advocating a 
transformation of the political and social – economic context in the target (country).”55 
The theoretical foundation of the EU's role as modern conflict manager able to deliver 
a holistic solution for all kinds of problems, ranging from armed conflicts to administrative 
issues, sounds promising. Yet, the question is how does it prove itself on the field? Many 
scholars believe that the analysis of the EU's work on the ground suggests that EU is nothing 
more but a paper tiger. Bickerton sarcastically comments on the  EU holistic approach by 
saying: “what underpins the EU's complexity is its own institutional confusion about 
mandates and roles.”56 Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin are less skeptical and claim that in 
case of EU's presence in BiH they “cannot identify for the country fundamentally more 
effective policy options than those chosen by the EU since 2002.”57 
 
3.Towards the regional approach. 
 
The idea of a unique and holistic approach towards BiH was brought about not only by 
the emergence of a new, post-Westphalian world order, but also by the EU's need to stabilize 
the political situation in the Balkan peninsula in order to ensure peace in Europe. The Balkans 
are often referred to as Europe's backyard, which suggests that they are somehow “outside” of 
Europe. This could not be more misleading – in the 90's the Western Balkan countries were 
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surrounded by EU from two sides – in the south by Greece and in the West by Italy.58 Thus it 
is only natural that the experience of the war in Bosnia and the unstable situation in Kosovo 
forced EU politicians to start developing in the 90's a regional approach towards Balkans. In 
1995, after the Dayton Peace Agreement ended the war in BiH, the EU expressed its support 
for the Western Balkans by offering help with reconstruction of the region.
59
 A year later, in 
1996 the EU adopted a regional approach, which main goal was to improve relations between 
the Balkan countries in order to attain stabilization of the region. It was worth noticing that 
with the regional approach of 1996 the EU also started to develop its policy towards BiH. As 
the document stated: “In view of its immediate needs, Bosnia-Herzegovina requires priority 
attention and a significant effort of rehabilitation before the elections, for the benefit of all 
ethnic groups. Without waiting for the outcome of the Donors' Conference, aid for the 
rehabilitation of Bosnia-Herzegovina - the bulk of which is currently being provided by the 
European Union - should be stepped up, as a supplement to Community programs, to meet 
pressing needs, especially everything required to facilitate the resettlement of refugees and 
displaced persons.”60 From 1996 BiH, as well as other countries of the region, were also 
receiving from EU financial support offered through the PHARE and OBNOVA programs (in 
2001 they were replaced with CARDS). 
In 1997 the EU complemented its regional approach with the concept of 
“conditionality”, which in the future, became one of the main elements of EU's policy towards 
countries aspiring for EU membership. The goal was to “set economic and political 
conditionality as the instruments for improvement of the relations and as a prerequisite for 
receiving reconstruction and development assistance from the Community Budget in the 
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Western Balkans, and BiH in particular.”61 In 1998, during the Vienna Summit, the EU 
developed a common strategy towards the Western Balkans, yet it was not until 1999, when 
EU decided to offer the region more than just economic assistance. In 1999 in Cologne a 
Stability Pact for South - Eastern Europe was lunched and in its “founding document (...) the 
EU, which assumed a leading role in the Pact, undertook to draw South Eastern Europe 
‘closer to the perspective of full integration ... into its structures’, including eventual full 
membership.”62 It was the first time when the integration perspective was introduced to the 
Balkan countries. In 2000, the European Council meeting at Santa Maria da Feira described 
the Western Balkans countries as “potential candidates”. As noted earlier this was the same 
meeting during which EU addressed the main goals of the civilian crisis management. A few 
months later, in November 2000 during the Zagreb summit the EU established the 
Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) based on three main elements – the Stabilization 
and Association Agreement, financial assistance and mechanisms of trade.
63
 From the EU 
perspective SAP was supposed to serve as a “policy tool that would help the establishment of 
democracy based on the rule of law, the development of a market economy and combating 
organized crime.”64 
The Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 confirmed the Balkan states prospective 
membership in the EU. The Thessaloniki declaration clearly stated that “the Stabilization and 
Association Process (SAP) will remain the framework for the European course of the Western 
Balkan countries, all the way to their future accession. The process and the prospects it offers 
serve as the anchor for reform in the Western Balkans, in the same way the accession process 
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has done in Central and Eastern Europe.”65 
As the EU's engagement in the region went hand in hand with Brussels’ development 
of the crisis management concept as well as with defining EU's role on the international arena 
as a normative power with hard power tools, it is not surprising that when the EU finally 
decided to deploy its crisis management missions in BiH it wanted them to be fully 
coordinated with other EU policies towards the region. Therefore it is almost impossible to 
separate the goals of the missions themself from the EU's long - term goals, one of them being 
integrating BiH into EU structures. It is well visible in the case of the police reform which at 
first was one of the goals of the EUMP mission, though soon it was incorporated into 
conditions set by Brussels for Sarajevo in order to sign the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (SAA). Therefore EUMP became in fact one of tools used by Brussels in order to 
“integrate BiH into the Euro-Atlantic structures.”66 Similarly EUFOR became a part of a 
“membership mechanism” as the fight against organized crime also became an necessary 
element for Sarajevo's integration with Brussels. As Howorth notes, “in medium term, the 
mission aimed to help BiH move towards EU membership, through the signature of the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement; and in the long term to create a stable, viable and 
multiethnic BiH working harmoniously with its neighbors.”67 The correlation of different 
EU's goals and tools and the interdependence between crisis management missions and the 
integration process makes the evaluation of the EUMP's and EUFOR's presence in BiH quite 
difficult. The goals of the missions became hard to point out, as they are a mix of short and 
long – term goals, and without clear goals it is difficult to evaluate whether the missions are 
successful or not. It is also necessary to set those missions in the context of political, 
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economic, and social problems of post -war Bosnia. 
 
4.What is Bosnia – the overview of the country. 
 
The Dayton Peace Accords signed on the 14
th
 of December, 1995 officially ended the 
Bosnian war - the third and the most brutal stage of the dissolution of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. In 1991 Slovenia and Croatia, as the first of the Yugoslav republics, 
declared independence and were recognized as sovereign states by the international 
community. Their succession fueled the Bosnian independent movement. Yet, the situation in 
BiH was much more complicated, because unlike Croatia or Slovenia, it did not consist of one 
dominant nation. Out of 4,366,00 of Bosnia's inhabitants, 43,7% were Bosniaks, 31,4% Serbs 
and 17,3% Croats.
68
 While the leading regionally – based political parties  - Party for 
Democratic Action representing mostly Bosniaks and the Croat Democratic Community 
representing Croats supported BiH's independence, the Serb Democratic Party, representing 
Serbian interests, categorically opposed the idea. The division among Bosnians regarding the 
future of the country was confirmed by the result of the referendum held on March
 
1, 1992. 
Roughly one third of the country voted against the independence. Yet, as the majority of 
Bosnians supported the creation of an independent Bosnian state, at the end of May 1992 the 
international community recognized BiH as sovereign country. Shortly thereafter that the civil 
war broke out between Bosnian Serbs, supported by the Yugoslav National Army, and Croat 
and Bosniak’s military troops. Within a year the coalition between Croats and Bosniaks 
collapsed and the parties also plunged into war. 
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Throughout the war Serbs conducted systematic ethnic cleansing on the captured 
territory. As a result it became possible after the war to draw an ethnically - based boundaries 
between two separate parts of the Bosnian state – Serbs occupied mostly the northern and 
southern Bosnian territory connected with each other through the eastern corridor, whereas 
Croats and Bosniaks held the western and central parts of the country.
69
   
Map 1. Ethnic Composition of Bosnia before the War (1991)
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Map  2: Ethnic Composition of Bosnia after the War (2005) 
71  
 
Under Annex 2 of the DPA, the country was divided along those ethnic lines (“inter-
entity boundary lines”) constituting the creation of Republika Srpska, Bosniak – Croat 
Federation and district of Brcko. The reason for such a division was to secure the fire cease 
line, yet in the long - term it contributed to the establishment of an ethnically divided country 
in shape caused by ethnic cleansing.
72
 Under the Annex 4 of the Agreement, which serves as a 
Constitution of BiH, the Bosniak – Croat Federation was further divided into cantons and 
Republika Srpska “remained organized in a unitary, centralized fashion, with the Entity – 
level government dealing directly with the municipalities.”73 Under the agreement “the two 
entities (…) retained significant autonomy (…), with exclusive authority over their own 
armed forces, internal affairs (including police), judiciary, and a wide range of social 
                                                 
71
 B.a. Dictionary of Gross Human Rights Violations, Shared Humanity.org., Accessed on-line March 29, 2012. 
http://www.sharedhumanity.org/LibraryArticle.php?heading=Bosnia,%20Gross%20Human%20Rights%20Violat
ions%20in 
72
The General Framework Agreement, December 14, 1995, Office of the High Representative, Accessed on-line 
April 01, 2012,. ://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=370 
73
 World Bank, Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 4. 
30 
 
sectors.”74 This division of authority, especially over the armed forces and police, soon 
became a thorn in the EU's flesh. The police reform became a condition for signing SAA and 
thus one of the main goals of EUMP mission. 
Annex 4 of the agreement established also state - level government. The legislative 
organ, a bicameral Parliamentary Assembly, consists of the House of People and the National 
Assembly. The presidency, a triple body serving as a head of the country, is responsible for 
“conducting the foreign policy of BiH”75 and “representing BiH in international and European 
organizations.”76 The state – level government was supposed to represent all of the three 
constituent peoples. Yet, due to its very limited powers as well as constant disagreements 
between the Serbian, Croatian and Bosniak politicians the central government is often 
perceived as highly inefficient.
77
 Tuathail, O'Loughlin and Djipa argue that this description 
should apply to the whole administrative structure of the country. In their opinion “the 
(Dayton Peace) agreement established what has been described as 'one of the most 
complicated and wasteful systems of government ever advised', namely a weak and meager 
central government, two state – like ethnonationalist entities (…), 10 cantons within the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (…) and 142 local municipalities.”78 Yet, the 
complicated structure of the Bosnian administration is not the main, and definitely not the 
only reason for the repeating political deadlock. The main problem is that the shape of the 
country, its constitution and main symbols do not reflect the true will of the Bosnian people. 
Stanisławski and Szpala underlines that there is an ongoing debate “concerning the legal force 
of the constitution. The act was drafted by US constitutionalists and signed by three 
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presidents, two of whom (the leaders of Croatia and Serbia) represented neighboring 
countries. The constitution was never formally adopted in a vote or referendum by the citizens 
of post-war Bosnia themselves.” (sic!)79 Also the Bosnian flag, a most prominent symbol of 
the state, reflects rather the international community’s role in the country than Bosnian values 
or history. Although the blue and yellow does resemble the flag of the Independent Republic 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 - 1998, the yellow stars on the navy - blue 
background makes the association with EU and NATO definitely stronger. Due to the fact that 
the international community seemed to be much more engaged in reaching the agreement than 
were the conflicted parties, Cousens and Cater state that “the central implication for peace 
implementation was clear: having been brought to the table by varying forms and degrees of 
coercion, the parties had little more than tactical commitment to settle (…) any chance for 
implementation would depend on international third parties.”80 
The role of the international community in the peace implementation (and in some 
cases within the country's political system) had been secured from the very beginning. The 
following table presents the list of the international actors involved in post-war Bosnia and 
their main duties outlined by the General Framework Agreement. 
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Table 1. The Dayton Peace Accords and its implementers.
 81
 
 
 
Annex 10 of the General Framework Agreement established the office of a High 
Representative (OHR), whose main goal was to oversee the implementation of the peace 
agreement. Due to the annex the role of OHR was “to facilitate the Parties' own efforts and to 
mobilize and, as appropriate, coordinate the activities of the organizations and agencies 
involved in the civilian aspects of the peace settlement by carrying out, as entrusted by a U.N. 
Security Council resolution, the tasks set (within the Agreement).”82 Thus, HR was mostly 
supposed to serve as a consultant – the lack of more direct powers was often criticized by 
commentators. The more “strategic oversight was meant to come from a newly established 
Peace Implementation Council (PIC) composed of implementation – friendly governments, to 
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whom the High Representative would report.”83 The body was set during the Conference for 
the implementation of the peace, held in London on 8-9 December 1995 and one of its 
responsibilities was to appoint the High Representative.
84
 In 1997 the scope of High 
Representative's powers were broadened by the Bonn Prerogative. It enabled the HR to 
dismiss any Bosnian politician “suspected of violating the law or sabotaging the peace 
process, dissolve political parties and impose legal solutions (…) including amendments to 
the constitutions of the entities.”85 Thus, the High Representative became one of the main 
sources of law in Bosnia, turning the country into an “international community's informal 
protectorate.”86 
Under the General Framework Agreement the role of peacekeeping was handed to the 
multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) led by NATO. It consisted of 60,000 troops. Its 
authority and responsibilities were quite extensive, varying from stabilizing the cease-fire and 
separating the arm forces, through supervising “human and non-discriminatory law 
enforcement”, to carrying out the “return – related responsibilities of the UN High 
Commissioner for refugees (UNHCR).”87 In 1996 IFOR was replaced by SFOR, a 
stabilization mission also lead by NATO, and in 2004 by EU's EUFOR. Due to the Annex 11 
of the General Framework Agreement the UN established an International Police Task Force 
(IPTF). The main goal of IPTF was “maintaining civilian law enforcement agencies operating 
in accordance with recognized standards and with respect for internationally recognized 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.”88 It was supposed to serve as a supervisor and 
advisor for the reforms Bosnian police needed to go through. In 2003 its responsibilities were 
taken over by the EU's EUMP. 
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The extensive presence of international actors proved to be insufficient for solving 
Bosnian post-war problems. Due to the fact that the peace agreement and its provisions were 
forced on the parties, the national rhetoric was, after the war, still commonly heard on all 
three sides of the conflict and within this rhetoric (especially on the Serbian side) the 
international community was often portrayed as an enemy. Thus, Ana Juncos argues that in 
post-war Bosnia “the main line of confrontation has been between Bosnians (of all three 
groups) and (representatives) of the international community.”89 As a result, the international 
community did not only have to deal with the reconstruction of the country, but also with the 
insubordination of its politicians. 
The next problem of the country, strongly connected with the national rhetoric, is the 
broad question of the legacy of the war. Many of the high - ranking Bosnian politicians as 
well as members of the armed forces and police were actively involved in the war. Thus those 
who after the war were supposed to bring people together were often war criminals. 
Moreover, they were responsible for the crimes committed against a large part of the society 
they were after the war supposed to serve.
90
 Furthermore, the four years of conflict resulted 
not only in a vast amount of victims, but also created a group of war profiteers, who during 
the war were able to earn both power and money through various illegal activities.
91
 They 
quickly became an important element of Bosnian organized crime. Fisher connects the 
criminalization of the country with the national rhetoric by writing that “the local conflict 
parties’ continued support for ethnic segregation should not only be seen as an expression of 
ethnopolitical ideology and power interests. There is strong evidence that striving for 
‘perpetuating the “mafia-type” war economy by other means’ has played a part, and this is 
reliant on the sanctuary provided by the ethnic community: a polity based on ethnic 
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community and solidarity allows a wider scope for semi-legal or illegal business activity than 
a legal and bureaucratic state with its anonymous organs.”92The illegal businesses in BiH 
varied from drugs, weapons and human trafficking to the embezzlement of international 
financial support. 
Another aspect of the legacy of the war was the question of prosecuting the war 
crimes. Parties often idealized them as national heroes (as it was in case of Radovan Karadzic 
or Radko Mladic) and thus were very resistant to their capture. The full cooperation with the 
 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia  (ICTY) quickly became one of the 
conditions for BiH for the integration with Euro-Atlantic structures, yet, the results were still 
rather unsatisfying, especially on the Serbian side. The fight against organized crime and 
criminal prosecution became an agenda for the EU crisis management missions as they were 
indispensable elements for reconstructing and securing the country and an important part of 
the EU's field test. As Oswald suggests, “If the EU should fail to build a state in BiH capable 
of fighting the organized crime the European Security Strategy (ESS) will lose credibility. It 
will be perceived as strategy not sufficient to face important threats.”93 
During the first years after the conflict the international Community was able to solve 
many of the most urgent problems of the country, preventing it from the renewal of military 
conflict and stabilizing it economically. Yet, many of the questions of the post-war Bosnia 
remained solved. When the EU deployed its police and military missions in Bosnia the reform 
of Bosnian police forces and the fight against organized crime was still on the agenda. Up 
until now BiH still needs international assistance – the EU is unable to withdraw its missions 
(although it did substantially cut down the EUFOR mission) and the OHR office remains in 
place. The lack of consensus among main politicians regarding the future of the country still 
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remains one of the main problems blocking Bosnia's transformation. The repeated deadlocks 
in the political life of the country are a result of, the conflict among the main ethnic groups 
(rooted in the war), the international community's incompetence, and the mistakes of the 
DPA. As Juncos suggests, “one of the main problems threatening the process towards EU 
integration is the unresolved issue regarding the status of the country. The Dayton Peace 
Accords is under continuous challenge in the process towards European integration. It is 
common knowledge that only the sovereign and self-sustained states can become members of 
the EU. But the DPA established a highly decentralized state, with weak, sometimes non-
existent state level institutions”94 
5. Summary 
 
It was not up until ’90 that EU became an important player on the international scene. 
The newly developed security and defense policy was supposed to help Brussels to respond to 
the erupting conflicts both outside the old continent as within it. One of the very first places 
where EU was able to test its crisis management abilities was Bosnia. Yet, the complicated 
ethnic structure of the country, the unresolved hostility between the main constituent nations 
and the peculiar political system made Bosnia a test that would be difficult to pass even for 
those more experience in the conflict resolution. Seventeen years after the war Bosnia is still 
far from being sustainable. For Brussels a failure in Bosnia would not only mean a failure as a 
crisis manager but also a failure as a regional and international player. It is Sarajevo were all 
EU policies meets – the enlargement policy, regional approach and crisis management 
measures. Yet, the wide range of the tools used by Brussels in Bosnia has its upsides. EU 
missions in Bosnia are dependent on the bureaucracy, their responsibilities often over lap and 
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the goals, both long and short term, are often hard to define. Thus, some scholars argue that 
Brussels “holistic approach” should be rather described as holistic bureaucracy. 
As it was presented throughout this chapter, along with the theoretical discussion 
about EU abilities it is also important to deliver a “ground analysis” of the missions, as it is 
the only way to check weather Brussels is succeeding or failing in Bosnia. The “bottom 
approach” to the problems allows also shift the focus form EU to the country that needs its 
assistance – after all EU in Bosnia is supposed to serve not only its own interests but more 
notably to help the country become sustainable.   
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CHAPTER II  
CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT MISSION. 
THE EVALUATION OF EUPM. 
 
 
On January 1, 2003, the European Union launched its first -ever civilian crisis man-
agement mission under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) – European Union 
Police Mission I (EUPM I) in Bosnia – Herzegovina. The operation was established by the 
decision of the Council of the EU on March 11,
 
2002, and it took over the responsibilities 
from the United Nation’s International Police Task Force. Initially it was expected to last for 
three years and was judged by many scholars as “the most ambitious attempts of the EU to 
test its civilian crisis management competencies in the area of rule of law.”95As we speak, the 
EUPM is still present in Bosnia – the suggested three years proved not to be enough for Brus-
sels to achieve its goals. The question of how well the EU passed the test on its crisis man-
agement competencies remains open. In order to evaluate the mission it is necessary to under-
stand the broader political and social context in which it was deployed, analyze its goals, de-
fine the meaning of success and present the outcome of its nine years on the ground. 
 
1. A general overview of post-war Bosnia. 
 
The Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) that ended the Bosnian war in 1995 were presented 
to the public as a great international success. Yet, the price paid for peace quickly proved to 
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be extremely high. As the study presented earlier, in accordance to the DPA, the country was 
divided along the ethnic lines into two entities. It recognized de facto the ethnic cleansing that 
took place during the war and thus ensured that hostility among the main nations would con-
tinue. The territorial division went hand in hand with the power-sharing agreements. In order 
to satisfy all the parties, DPA granted the entities significant autonomy and left the central 
government extremely weak and administratively dysfunctional.  As a result “the ethnic self-
rule was (…) clearly emphasized at the expense shared rule (…) putting into question the 
very viability of the common state for several years.”96  
The question of the redistribution of power was also strictly connected with the prob-
lem of the future police structure. None of the three nations welcomed the proposition to cre-
ate the common police forces enthusiastically, yet it was the Bosnian Serbs who opposed the 
idea the most. Their strong stand on this matter can be easily explained. According to Max 
Weber’s theory, the “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” is one of the elements 
that constitute the state.
97
 Thus, for  the Serbs, such as it would for any other group demand-
ing sovereignty, resigning from control over the police forces meant to surrender. The term 
“surrender” seems to fit in this context quite well. It helps to explain the extent of the hostility 
within the Bosnian post war society. As Timothy Donais points out, “the Dayton agreement 
failed to resolve the core issues around which the war was fought”; thus, quoting Susan 
Woodward, it can be argued that in post war Bosnia the parties were “still fighting the war for 
statehood; only their means of securing territory and national survival have changed.”98 Quite 
understandably, if the “post-war war” was still being fought, the police was an important ele-
ment of the parties power. Control over the police forces helped to legitimize the autonomy of 
                                                 
96
 Stefano Recchia, “Beyond International Trusteeship: EU Peace building in Bosnia Herzegovina”,  Occasional 
Paper no. 66, EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS), ( February, 2007),  p. 8. Accessed June 11 2012 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/occ66.pdf  
97
 H.H. Gerth, C. Wright Mills, eds,  From Max: Weber Essays in Sociology, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1958) , p.1. 
98
 Timothy Donais, “The Politics of Privatization in Post-Dayton Bosnia”, Southeast European Politics Vol. III, 
No. 1 (June 2002), p. 2. ; Susan Woodward, “Bosnia”, The Brookings Review, (June 1997), p. 29. 
40 
 
the entities. Brussels, pushing for the centralization of the law enforcement agencies, logically 
started to be perceived by many, especially the Bosnian Serbs and Croats, as an opponent try-
ing to impose laws that had no legitimacy among the people and that were harmful for the 
parties to the conflict.  
The discussion over the future shape of the police forces was also closely connected 
with the broader question about the criminalization of the post – war politics. During the Bos-
nian conflict police forces were actively engaged in the combat. According to the Internation-
al Crisis Group (ICG), between “1992-1995 (…), the police were a key instrument of ethnic 
cleansing – particularly in Republika Srpska and the Croatian areas of the Federation.”99 Po-
lice officers actively participated in the war crimes and were involved in establishing some of 
the concentration camps. After the embargo imposed by the international community on Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992, police forces became also an important element of the 
black market. They were involved in arms smuggling, human trafficking and black-
marketing. The power over those illegal activities was exercised by warlord, who, in turn, 
were mostly politicians. It lead to enriching and politicizing the police structures. As a result, 
in the post war period the police forces played a significant role in the criminalized political 
life.
100
 Thus, for the politicians, retaining the control over the police forces meant securing 
their own position. It’s only logical that Slobodan Milosevic, later accused of crimes against 
humanity, in signing the Dayton Peace Accords on the behalf of another fugitive, Radovan 
Karadzic, would never agree on creating common, democratic and transparent police forces.  
Due to the lack of willingness among the parties to unify the police, the DPA estab-
lished a highly scattered police structure. As a result, after the creation of Brcko district, “13 
autonomous law enforcement agencies (were created): 1 unique centralized police force in 
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Banja Luka, (…), 1 federal police force in the Federation (…), 10 cantonal police agencies 
(…) and 1 district police force.”101 In practice the DPA constituted a highly dysfunctional sys-
tem that was not satisfactory for any of the parties. According to Woodward  “for three war-
ring (…) parties, the General Framework Agreement for Peace (…was) only a cease-fire. 
They did not accept the accord as definitive politically, seeing it only as an insecure stepping-
stone.”102 The agreement was perceived similarly by the international community, which be-
lieved that it “was designed as the least bad solution at that time, with the hope that one day it 
would serve to overcome actual partition on the ground. (…) (It)  believed that nationalist pol-
itics would progressively fade away.”103   
 
2. From IPTF to EUPM. 
 
The criminalized political scene, the hostile atmosphere between the three constituent 
nations and the lack of support for the DPA made the presence of the international community 
in Bosnia both necessary and extremely difficult. One of the goals of the international actors 
involved in post-war Bosnia was to “provide a safe and secure environment for all persons in 
their respective jurisdictions.”104 In accordance with annex 11 of DPA this task was granted to 
United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF). It became responsible for “maintain-
ing civilian law enforcement agencies operating in accordance with internationally recognized 
standards and with respect for internationally recognized human rights and fundamental free-
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doms.”105 Due to the very low standards of the post – war police forces in Bosnia, IPTF was 
mostly engaged in dealing with individuals within the process of demobilization and restruc-
turing the police forces.
106
 Its most notable successes were the removal of “many officers ac-
cused of war crimes or having criminal records” and  quite successfully weakening the rela-
tionship between politics and the police.
107
 The International Crisis Group also points out that 
IPTF “was a major force for change in the war-torn country, managing to halve police num-
bers (and) installing training course.”108 The IPTF’s overall presence on the ground is mostly 
perceived as a successful immediate post – conflict intervention.109 Responding to the most 
visible problems of the Bosnian society, the IPTF worked, using Dominic Wisler’s terminolo-
gy, on the micro level, focusing mostly on “training and monitoring” individuals.110  
Despite many its many successes, when in 2005 IPTF left the country, several of Bos-
nia’s problems remained unsolved. The police forces were highly decentralized and there was 
almost no cooperation between entities themselves, and between the entities and the Federa-
tion.
111
 Also the relationship between the police forces and administration of justice was un-
satisfying.
112
 Organized crime, including human trafficking, corruption and smuggling – re-
mained an issue. Although organized crime had a regional character and Bosnia was only a 
part of the criminal network, it had an visible impact on the internal problems of the country. 
As EU External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten pointed out, “this pernicious web of 
crime” feeds “nationalism and extremism – and vice versa – corrupting and emasculating pub-
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lic administrations”.113 Due to the high level of corruption and still well-heard nationalistic 
slogans, popular confidence in government as well as its police forces was rather low. One of 
the challenges for IPTF’s successor was to first reform the police and later change its image 
among the society. The goal was to present the police as apolitical, trustful, free from corrup-
tion and serving Bosnians, not the politicians.
114
 This was strictly connected with a broader 
problem of the country – the legitimacy of the war. As Judy Batt rightly pointed out: “Bosnia 
was still a post-conflict  society, and the traumas of the recent past overshadow everything 
and permeate every  issue.”115  
As a result of the complexity of its problems Bosnia needed assistance from an inter-
national organization that would be able to understand the core issues of the country and de-
velop a holistic response to them. Thus, when IPTF’s mandate came to an end the question 
arose about what agency would be best suitable to build on its successes, and at the same time 
move to the next levels of intervention. Despite many suggestions that the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) should continue IPTF’s work, it was the EU 
that finally won the mandate. On one hand it seemed quite logical that with Bosnia’s geopolit-
ical position and its European aspirations, Brussels would be the best candidate to assist the 
country with the much needed reforms. On the other hand “the key issue was whether the EU 
was politically willing or functionally capable of mounting such a mission.”116 In its 2002 re-
port the International Crisis Group (ICG) suggested that although “the EU is developing a ca-
pacity for intervention under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP), (…) (it) may 
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not (be) ready in time for Bosnia.”117  Yet, for Brussels, taking over the responsibilities from 
the UN was a question of to be or not to be an international player and a crisis manager. As 
Javier Solana stated at the opening of the EUMP mission: “for  us, it is not without some 
emotion that we will see for the first time our European colors adorn the national uniforms of 
our police officers in a mission on the ground.  It is a strong symbol of the collective will of 
Europeans to act jointly in this key task of consolidating stability and security in our conti-
nent.”118 There is no doubt that the decision to grant the police mission to the EU was based 
not only on its real capacities to perform such a duty, but was also deeply rooted in the inter-
national politics.  
 
3. The beginning of the mission 
 
The EUPM mandate began on January 1, 2003, and was initially supposed to last for 
three years. On the January 1, 2006, Brussels decided to establish a two years follow – on 
mission, called EUMP II. 
119
 Later the mission was extended on annual basic and will proba-
bly be extended at least until the end of the year 2012. In accordance with the Joint Action of 
the Council of the European Union, the budget for the year 2002, the start – up of the mission, 
was estimated at 14 million euro. Another 38 million euro were designed “for yearly running 
costs for the years 2003 to 2005.”120 The European Union Institute for the Security Studies 
(EU ISS) estimated that in 2006 the mission’s budget amounted to 12 million euro, in 2007 to 
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12.5 million euro, in 2008 to 14.8 million euro and in 2009 to 12.4 million euro.
121
 In compar-
ison, The UN General Assembly, assigned 144.7 million dollars (approximately 165 million 
euro)  for maintaining its United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMBIH) in 
the period between July 2001 to June 2002. 
122
 According to the International Crisis Group, 
the estimated annual cost of maintaining IPTF (the major organization within UNMBIH) was 
121 million dollars (around 137, 8795 euro.)
123
 Also the number of police officers deployed 
on the ground was substantially different in both cases. IPTF was composed of around 1600 
officers, whereas EUMP in its first phase consisted of around 700 staff members. The size of 
the European mission was later systematically reduced. The table below illustrate the decrease 
in number of police officers deployed by the mission. 
 
Table 2. The number EUPM’s of police officers by year. 124 
 
 
Despite the visible disproportions in both the budget and the staff provided by UN and 
EU, EUMP duties were even broader than its predecessor’s. To begin with the EUMP decided 
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to move its intervention from a micro level, to the meso and macro level. As Wisler explains, 
“the meso level is the level of organization (…) dealing with the internal structure of a police 
force (…) (whereas) macro – level projects deal with the redistribution of power between 
agencies or levels of government.”125 In other words, instead on focusing on individuals, Eu-
ropean Union decided to present a holistic and very comprehensive plan for reorganization of 
the police structures. Moreover, the EU was eager to make the EUPM mandate  a part of 
Brussels’ broader approach towards Bosnia, an approach that would extend beyond the Day-
ton Agreement. The goal was to move Bosnia from the “Dayton to European period” by tak-
ing over UN and NATO responsibilities and establishing in 2002 the post of  European Union 
Special Representative. Since then it was Brussels, not the Dayton Peace Accords that was 
supposed to serve as a main source of law. Unfortunately, although in the case of police re-
structuring the move from the micro to the macro level was unquestionably necessary, and the 
holistic approach to Bosnia was also very much needed, many scholars argue that it was done 
too early and by an organization that was too little experienced. The International Crisis 
Group, in its highly critical 2005 report towards the EUMP, states that “keen to score an early 
success for its nascent European Security and Defense Policy, the Union underestimated both 
the size and the complexity of the task in Bosnia.”126 In order to evaluate the failures and suc-
cesses of the first EU civilian crisis management mission it is necessary to first understand 
what were its goals. 
 
4. EUPM, its goals and structure. 
 
When in 2003 the EUMP was taking over from the IPTF its main goal was to “es-
tablish sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership in accordance with the best 
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European and international practices and, thereby raising current BiH police standards.”127 Its 
primary objectives came down to four points: 
a. The development of police independence and accountability 
b. The fight against organized crime 
c. The financial viability and sustainability of the local police 
d. Institution and capacity building128 
And were pursued in seven main areas: 
1. Criminal police 
2. Criminal justice 
3. Internal affairs 
4. Police administration 
5. Public order and security 
6. SBS (State Border Service) 
7. SIPA (State Investigation and Protection Agency)129 
UE policemen had no executive power, which visibly differentiated them from the 
UN officers and EUFOR Althea staff. They were widely dispensed, working in 33 units co-
located both in the state level institutions as well as within the entity level structures. As the 
Joint Action of the Council of the European Union states, the officers were deployed in “Pub-
lic Security Centers, Cantons, State Investigation and Protection Agency, State Border Ser-
vices and within the Brcko district.”130  
Such a co-location of EU staff members was highly criticized by the international 
observers. As the British Institute of International and Cooperative Law wrote, “the organiza-
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tion of the mission was poor and it seemed officers were dispatched around the country rather 
arbitrary.”131 In addition the tasks were often assigned randomly. Due to the lack of a well - 
defined common program, the EUPM was not treated as an unified force, but as group of dif-
ferent units from different countries.
132
 Thus, the system of allotting the tasks was based on 
the countries’ individual capabilities rather than on the EUPM’s holistic plan. As Dominique 
Orsini states “It creates the impression that EUPM  was not much more than an umbrella for 
bilateral policing cooperation.”133 Moreover, the unintended division of the tasks based on the 
nationality of the officers clearly indicated that EUMP was not ready to offer a holistic solu-
tion for Bosnia’s problems. The fact that the EUPM officers were supposed to be allocated in 
multi-national teams, but in practice were working in national groups proved that Brussels 
was unable to control its own mission. 
Due to the high criticism received by the EUPM I from the international observers, 
when in 2005 the mission’s mandate came to an end  the EU decided to replace it with EUMP 
II. Both the goals and the structure of the follow-up mission were redefined. The new mandate 
of EUMP II was built on three pillars: 
e. Supporting the local police in the fight against organized crime; 
f. Conducting inspections and monitoring of police operations; 
g. Supporting the implementation of police restructuring.134 
The fight against organized crime quickly became one of the most important elements of the 
EUPM II mandate.
135
 In 2009 “the council of the EU declared that EUPM in BiH (…) will 
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primarily support State Level Law Enforcement Agencies in the fight against organized 
crime.”136 In order to do so, EUPM specified six goals which included: 
h. strengthening the operational capacity and joint capability of Law Enforcement 
Agencies engaged in the fight against organized crime and corruption 
i. assisting and supporting the planning and conduct of investigations in the fight 
against organized crime and corruption through a systematic approach 
j. assisting and promoting the development of criminal investigative capacities of 
BiH 
k. enhancing police-prosecution cooperation 
l. strengthening the police – penitentiary system 
m. contributing to ensuring a suitable level of accountability.137 
EUPM II had also a modified structure. The former method of placing officers was replaced 
with a regional approach. Instead of assigning officers to various institutions, they were sent 
to one of the four regional centers, corresponding to those of SIPA: Sarajevo, Tuzla, Banja 
Luka and Mostar.
138
 Although the reorganization was unquestionably necessary, the study 
will argue later on that the changes were only cosmetic and did not deal with the core short-
comings of the operation. 
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5. What does “success” mean for EUPM? 
 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the EU civilian crisis management mission in 
Bosnia it is first necessary to define the ideal outcome of the operation. Although it seems ob-
vious that it should have been done before both deploying the mission and analyzing its re-
sults, in practice one can get the impression that the EU representatives as well as scholars 
were unable to agree upon a common definition of success. As the study presented earlier, for 
Brussels the deployment of the crisis management missions in Bosnia was “the test ground 
(…) for the new ESDP project.”139 If the EU was about to send its troops in order to prove 
that it was capable of playing a role of an international crisis manager, then it can be argued 
that by virtue of its presence in Bosnia it has reached its goals. As Eva Gross suggests, “a 
minimalist standard of success would be of a purely administrative nature internal to the EU, 
namely achieving the deployment of military or police forces (or both) with necessary equip-
ment and resources to the various theatres of operation.”140 This is a highly cynical and ex-
treme definition of EU’s success in Bosnia and it would probably have more opponents than 
supporters among EU officials. Yet, undoubtedly there is a grain of truth in its twisted log-
ic.
141
 As Isabelle Maras argues, “the need for an objective evaluation of the mission’s 
achievements is blurred by the political interests of the European Union (…) to present a mis-
sion with an European flag as successful.”142 Many studies focusing on the evaluation of the 
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EU ESDP missions from the perspective of the European Union’s role in the international 
arena, more or less, use this “minimalistic” definition of success.143  
Another definition suggests that the goal of the EU crisis management mission’s pres-
ence in Bosnia was to prevent the export of the conflict to the other parts of the old continent. 
Securing peace in Bosnia meant securing the whole of Europe.
144
  This definition corresponds 
with the main goal of the EUMP, which quickly proved to be the fighting against organized 
crime. As the European Security Strategy clearly indicated in 2003, “Europe is a prime target 
for organized crime. This internal threat to our security has an important external dimension: 
cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons accounts for a large 
part of the activities of criminal  gangs.”145 Following this logic it is possible to create a pre-
cise definition of mission’s success, based purely on the goals that the EUMP was supposed 
to achieve. In that case the EUMP mission would be called successful only if it were able to 
develop police independence and accountability, fight organized crime and apply European 
standards of policing and the rule of law.
146
 
Due to the focus of this thesis the last, and most precise definition will be applied. The 
evaluation of the mission will be mostly based on EUMP’s actions on the ground and its abil-
ity to tackle its goals. 
 
6. EUPM I, the main problems and achievements. 
 
One of the fundamental shortcomings of the EUPM mission in Bosnia was its inability 
to deliver a clear definition of its tasks. As this study mentioned earlier, the mission was sup-
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posed “to apply the concept of ‘ European police standards/practices.”147 Yet, the EU never 
clearly explained the concept and it also failed to deliver a definition at the operational lev-
el.
148
 In Orsin’s opinion it showed “a lack of any serious thinking about defining what kind of 
policing ‘product’ the EU should offer (to Bosnia).”149 It also caused frustration among the 
EUPM officers.
150
 Moreover, there was a visible discrepancy between the type of mandate 
EUPM received and the kind of work it was supposed to deliver. Unlike the IPTF, the EUPM 
was not supposed to deal with individual policemen, but was charged with the institutional 
reforms and capacity – building of the police forces. Thus, many of its tasks were administra-
tive in nature. Moreover, they were aimed not only at changing the institutions, but also the 
culture among their personnel. Those were clearly long-term goals that needed a long-term 
mandate. As one of the EUPM officers noticed: “[I]t is very easy to create structures and insti-
tutions, but you also have to change the mindset and that takes time. The more you go on to 
the substance  and the cultures, the more it takes time.”151 Following this logic another of the 
EUPM officials claimed that “[B]ringing the Bosnian police standards to the European ones 
in three years was unrealistic.”152 
The complexity of the EUPM’s goals required highly experienced staff that possesed 
knowledge of administrative reforms, finances and project management, among others. Un-
fortunately, EUPM did not have the time and resources for advanced planning of its opera-
tion. Therefore, “many of police officers lacked experience in program develop-
ment/evaluation, survey and regional politics in the Balkans.”153 The British Institute of Com-
parative Law harshly evaluated EUPM’s staff as well, writing that: “under qualified officers 
from contributing states were tasked to design and implement public administration reform 
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without any training skills.”154 The low standards of education and a lack of expertise among 
the EUPM’s staff can be partially blamed for the lack of a “standby” police unit that EU 
would be able to deploy if needed. Most of the EUPM members were volunteers from various 
countries and did not receive the necessary training in human rights, fighting against orga-
nized crime, Bosnia’s complex history and social problems before the deployment.155 Moreo-
ver, as Center for European Policy Studies argued “in the case of EUPM I, officers were sent 
into the field offices without implementation guidelines and assessment protocol.”156 
The effectiveness of the EUPM mission was also hindered by the language barrier ex-
perienced by many of its staff members. It had been reported that many of the officials lacked 
sufficient knowledge of the English language, the official language of the mission.
157
 As it 
was noticed in the 2006 European Security Review those unacceptable communication prob-
lems were a natural result of the EUPM recruitment process, which did not include a English 
language test for the potential mission members.
158
 Moreover, almost none of the EUPM of-
ficers spoke Serbian, Croatian or Bosnian. Thus, “seconded police officers communicated in 
English with their counterparts in the Bosnian police agencies, and often through a transla-
tor.”159 It made the relationship between local and European officials more difficult and thus 
slowed the learning process.  
The possible results of the mission were also undermined  by the short – term ap-
pointments of the EUPM members.
160
 Most of the officers were staying in Bosnia between 6 
to 12 months, a period that proved to be insufficient to learn the projects, understand them, 
and most notably establish a relationship with local officers and enjoy their confidence. It 
meant in practice that European policeman had “to move to their home countries just around 
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the time they finally familiarized themselves with the conduct of Bosnian police.”161 The 
short term appointments and language barriers proved to be an obstacle, especially in the fight 
against corruption. EUPM officers did not have sufficient time to fully understand on-going 
corruption processes. They were also unable to understand the language of the local officers; 
thus, corruption among them was commonly overlooked. 
Finally EUPM was also strongly criticized for the way it took over from IPTF. In or-
der to secure a smooth transition the EU sent a planning team led by Sven Fredriksen, who 
was, at the same time a head of the IPTF mission, and later became s head of the EUPM mis-
sion.
162
 In theory having the commander of a former mission also as head of a new one was 
supposed to make the process of “passing the lesson learned” between those two operations 
possible. In practice however, it “blurred the picture concerning who should be responsible 
for actions taken or decisions made or not made by the IPTF.”163 Additionally, a vast number 
of the officers employed earlier by the IPTF were also hired by the EUPM. Finally, the Euro-
pean mission continued many of the UN programs, instead of establishing new ones. 
164
 Con-
sequently it was difficult to distinguish those two missions, which led to a series of confusions 
between both the EUPM staff and local officers and authority. 
The lack of clear separation between IPTF and EUPM was also connected with the EU 
inability to present a coherent “plan for Bosnia”. As one of the officers later stated, “I would 
be more careful in planning and understanding what the mission is about. Because [in] the 
first 18 months it was not really going anywhere. After that, the focus of the mission changed 
and it was better, but still it was not as focused as it should [have been].”165 EUPM was also 
criticized for its weak mandate. The mission was only to “monitor, mentor and inspect”. Fur-
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thermore, officers, lacking clear guidelines, interpreted an already weak mandate “in the nar-
rowest possible fashion to avoid the assumption of responsibilities.”166  
Surely, the vague goals of EUPM and its inefficiency cannot be blamed simply on the 
mission itself. The operation should have been planned by the EU officials and the officers on 
the ground should have been provided with clear guidelines and necessary training. Unfortu-
nately, the mission was not planned properly, but it was not Brussels but the officers deployed 
in Bosnia who received the criticism. As the International Crisis Group wrote, “Bosnian po-
lice in both entities regard the EUPM as a laughing stock.”167 It also suggested at the end of 
2005 that “EUPM has proven so ineffective and has acquired such a negative reputation 
among both Bosnians and internationals that it should not be extended.”168 
Even those scholars and international observers who do not share the International 
Crisis Group’s radical verdict have trouble in pointing out EUPM I achievements. Penksa ar-
gues that “it furthered the institutionalization of the BiH State Investigation and Protection 
Agency (SIPA), as a police agency able to fight organized crime.”169 In practice though the 
agency was established before the EUPM I mandate started and were reformed after it end-
ed.
170
 As Penksa further points out EUPM also “enhanced the development of other state – 
level agencies such as the State Border Service (SBS), Ministry of Security (MoS) and estab-
lished the Police Restructuring Directorate.”171 Yet, those were successes that EUPM I was 
sharing with the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina (HR). For a mandate that 
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lasted for three years it’s a short and unsatisfactory list of achievements. It is quite safe to 
agree that the mission “fell short of expectations.”172 
 
7. EUPM II, the new face of the mission. 
 
Despite the International Crisis Group’s strong suggestion to end the European Police 
presence in Bosnia, in 2005 Brussels launched the second phase of the operation – EUPM II. 
As it was presented earlier the redefined mission were mostly supposed to support the imple-
mentation of the police restructuring and  to focus on the fight against organized crime. 
 
a. The police reform by the police officers? 
 
Reforming the Bosnian Police was one of the most complex tasks of the international 
community. As the OECD DAC handbook on security reform points out, “the police play a 
linking role in the criminal justice system, and as such provide a means of developing sector-
wide strategies. There are also important linkages with civil society, private security compa-
nies, oversight bodies, the defense and intelligence services, and border management agen-
cies.”173 Thus, police reform in Bosnia needed to be strictly connected with the rationalization 
of other elements of the state. Thus, understandably, it quickly became highly politicized. 
Moreover, when  it became one of the conditions for Sarajevo to sign the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union, it also started to play a significant 
role in Bosnia’s integration process with EU. Due to the complexity of the problem various 
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actors were involved in the reform. Among the most important were OHR/EUSR, the Euro-
pean Commission, and the Police Restructuring Directorate and EUPM. It is important to un-
derline that due to its mandate, the latter “did not have primary responsibility for the political 
process of facilitating the agreement on police reform in BiH.”174 Its main role was to support 
the implementation of the reform and suggest technical and functional improvements.  
Serious discussion over reforming Bosnia’s police forces started in 2003 with a feasi-
bility study in which the EU pointed out the main deficiencies of the Bosnian police forces.
175
 
In 2004 a special report prepared by International Center for Migration Policy Development 
(ICMPD) and Team Consult (TC) and requested by the European Commission presented 
three possible ways of reforming the organizational structure of the Bosnia’s police forces. It 
suggested either centralized police forces, a model based on entity forces  or a highly decen-
tralized structure based on the cantonal forces.
176
 The report also suggested that, as all of the 
three models were highly acceptable, the final decision which to apply should be based on a 
political consensus. In the authors’ opinion “local ownership is more important than a perfect 
solution on paper.”177 A proposal for the  police reform was also presented by EUPM. It sug-
gested the creation of a “police director, supervised by a state-level Ministry of Security” and 
five police regions.
178
 Whereas the ICMPD and TC report stressed the importance of the local 
ownership, the EUPM underlined the technical aspects of the future police structure, arguing 
that five police regions are optimal - more  “would cause coordination difficulties”.179 
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Unfortunately, none of the conclusions proved to be obvious for the EU politicians, 
eager to find a quick solution for Bosnia’s problems. Shortly after the ICMPD and TC report 
was published, the High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, created a Police Restructuring 
Commission which proposed a highly centralized police structure. The Commission based its 
plan on a model presented earlier by EUPM, yet instead of promoting the idea of five police 
regions, Commission decided to create ten of them. Thus, as International Crisis Group noted 
“not only did the (…) proposal envision more police regions than practical, but the multi-
ethnic character of its proposed regions was significantly diluted, thereby defeating much of 
the original purpose.”180 The European Commission favored a highly centralized police struc-
ture as well. It established three conditions on which reform was supposed to be based: 1) leg-
islative and budgetary competencies for all Bosnian police matters must be at the state level; 
2) no political interference in any operational police matter; 3) the establishment of local po-
lice areas according to purely  professional technical criteria.”181  
The response from Bosnia’s politicians was to be expected, especially since Bosnia’s 
Serbs from the very beginning categorically rejected the idea of centralizing the police forces. 
The model of police reform suggested by the EU was in conflict with the idea of local owner-
ship. Unfortunately, instead of reformulating the model in order to make it more adequate to 
the political environment of the country, the EU decided to find new ways in forcing through 
its plan. Believing that the prospective EU membership was one of its most powerful tools of 
persuasion, at “the beginning of 2005 the European Commission (…) tied the conclusion of 
Stabilization and Association Agreement with Bosnia – Herzegovina to concrete criteria for 
centralizing the police structure.”182 The police reform became one of the conditions for Bos-
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nia to sign the SAA. Yet Brussels visibly miscalculated the power of its enlargement carrot. 
For Bosnia’s politicians, especially Bosnia’s Serbs, possible integration with EU was less im-
portant than maintaining their autonomy within the country. As Juddy Batt argues  “the case 
of police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a story of the failure of EU conditionality.”183   
The High Representative’s decision to politicize the police reform by making it one of 
the conditions for signing the SAA was also highly criticized by the EUPM officials. The 
mission was supposed to support the implementation of the reform and help to apply the tech-
nical improvements. As was presented earlier, EUPM believed that from a technical point of 
view the centralization of the police structure was not the best solution. It also knew that the 
international and political dimension added to the already sensitive problem will only make 
its technical aspects less visible. The HR’s strong support for police centralization was in con-
tradiction to EUPM’s objectives and his actions “blocked progress at the technical/ functional 
level.”184 As EUPM was granted very few restructuring powers and its role was to support the 
reform rather than create it, it needed to conform to the OHR’s decision. Consequently, it was 
unable to assist the Bosnian police with the very needed technical improvements, as they were 
contradictory to the broader plan of police restructuring presented by the OHR. For EUPM the 
need to actively engage in the police reform also meant that it was unable to pursue other 
goals, such as the fight against organized crime.  
The discussion over the police reform stalled for almost two years, causing several po-
litical deadlocks, deepening conflicts between Bosnia’s constituent nations and strengthening 
the perception of the EU as an external, hostile power trying to impose laws that had no pub-
lic support.  By many Bosnians “the police restructuring process was regarded (…) as consti-
tutional reform by other means, where politics has often mattered more than the needs of 
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Bosnians.”185 The story of police reform seems to have no happy ending. Even when in 2008 
an agreement was finally reached, it proved to be little more than a paper declaration agreed 
upon in order to allow Bosnia to sign the SAA. 
 The police reform was strictly connected with the broader question of the country’s 
political structure and constitutional reform. In order to fully apply police reform Bosnia was 
supposed to first have undergone political centralization. Without constitutional reform the 
agreement over restructuring police
 
 forces meant very little. Muriel Assenburg and Ronja 
Kempin even argue that “in this context the police reform can actually be regarded as a step 
backward, because it had accomplished nothing but the creation of additional bureaucratic 
structures.”186 Similar conclusion was drawn by Juncos, who wrote that “after the years of 
political wrangling, the EU has only obtained (…) a vague political commitment dependent 
upon the outcome of future constitutional reforms, which may turn out to be even more sensi-
tive than police restructuring”187 
In 2012 the situation does not seem to be more optimistic. The discussion over the po-
lice reform was replaced by the discussion over the constitutional reform, yet the core prob-
lem remains the same– there is no agreement over strengthening the country’s central gov-
ernment, and as Tadeusz Joniewicz and Tomasz Żornaczuk argue in the PISM (the Polish In-
stitute for International Affairs) bulletin, it is very improbable that one will be reached 
soon.
188
 Moreover, the European Commission has been restrained when evaluating the out-
come of the police reform. In its 2011 progress report it stated that “some progress was made 
in police matters. Implementation of the police reform laws is slowly advancing.”189 A left-
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handed compliment taking under consideration that the reform was agreed upon three years 
ago. The commission’s conclusion is clear – “some progress in the field of police (was made) 
, albeit uneven. (…) The lack of institutionalized cooperation between all law enforcement 
agencies and the limited strategic guidance remain challenges to achieve more efficient polic-
ing.”190 Yet, it is important to keep in mind that the failure of the police reform cannot be di-
rectly translated as a failure of the EUPM. The police mission was only a supportive body. 
The main decisions were made by the OHR and the European Commission and the reform 
required institutional and social changes that were beyond EUPM’s competencies. The tech-
nical improvements that fell within  EUPM cognizance were slowed by international politics 
and OHR’s misjudgments. Thus, it is difficult to evaluate EUPM effectiveness based on its 
performance as one of the Bosnia’s police reformers.  
 
b. The fight against organized crime. 
 
In 2003 Javier Solana, the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Se-
curity Policy, as keys threats to global security pointed out state failure, characterized by ”bad 
governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability” and 
organized crime, with special emphasis on a “Balkan criminal network.”191 Bosnia was “di-
rectly relevant to (…) those threats”. 192 In 2005 the country ranked 22nd on the Failed State 
Index, it was corrupt, unstable politically, and was a part of an organized crime network.
193
 
For Brussels securing Bosnia meant securing the old continent. When in 2003 EU deployed 
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its police mission in Bosnia,  Javier Solana had high hopes. On January 15, 2003, he suggest-
ed that the main goals of the mission were to “contribute to "a peaceful and stable Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (and) firmly establish "the Rule of Law."
194
 In order to do so, the EUPM needed 
to fight organized crime. In 2009, the fight against organized crime became one of the main 
goals of the mission and on the April 26, 2010, the Council further narrowed down the mis-
sion mandate by  “refocusing (it) on the support to the fight against organized crime and cor-
ruption as well as results achieved so far in this area.”195  
It’s important to underline that the mission from the very beginning had no executive 
power and its objective was only to support the local agencies. As Stefan Feller, the Head of 
the Mission, argued in 2010, the operation “focuses on improving those elements which all 
the different law enforcement agencies and other parts of the criminal justice system in BIH 
have to develop, to make them better able to fight organized crime and corruption.”196 A very 
different approach to the problem was presented by the EUFOR Althea staff, who, having an 
executive mandate, were much more involved in fighting organize crime by themselves. The 
conflict that arose between those two operations will be presented  in more detail in subse-
quent chapter.  
Due to the limited scope of the EUPM’s mandate the mission’s achievements in the 
fight against organized crime come down mostly to the strengthening of the local agencies. 
The official website of the mission mentions  as some of its successes: 
- “Law enforcement agencies at state and entity level have reached joint strategic and oper-
ational capacity; 
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- The police and judiciary at state level have developed and applied investigative capability 
in consistent cooperation with police and judiciary at other levels; 
- The number of large scale anti-organized crime operations conducted by BiH police, in-
cluding cross-border operations, has significantly increased.”197 
The European Commission seems to have quite different perspective on those 
achievements. In its 2011 progress report it states that “the lack of institutionalized coopera-
tion between all law enforcement agencies and the limited strategic guidance remain chal-
lenges to achieve more efficient policing.”198 Moreover, it described the “cooperation between 
police and prosecutors (as) weak.”199 Also the “large scale anti-organized crime operations” 
mentioned on the official website are not as spectacular as suggested. The most successful 
pointed out by Feller were Operation Network 2010’ and the ‘Operation Light’.”200 However, 
especially the latter one had mostly PR value. The aim of the operation was a raid on a remote 
village Gornja Maoca, inhabited mostly by the followers of Sallafism. Bosnia’s authorities 
suspected the villagers to be linked with the Al-Qaida network. 
201
 The raid, planned for 
weeks, was supposed to be an important part in the fight against terrorism and organized 
crime. In practice however no evidence of a criminal network was found in the village; the 
police arrested a only couple of villagers and seized some arms, cell phones and computers. In 
a commentary on this action a “U.S. diplomat (…) said that "based on the stuff police are 
pulling out of there, the Salafis from Gornja Maoca do seem a bit like amateurs."”202 
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Also, the statistics suggests that under the guidance of EUPM Bosnia’s police and law 
enforcement agencies made little progress in the fight against organized crime. For the pur-
pose of this study, organized crime will be divided into three categories: narcotics trafficking, 
human trafficking, and corruption.  
 
Narcotic trafficking 
 
In the case of narcotic trafficking, in a 2007 report International Narcotics Control 
Board presented Bosnia as an important hub for narcotic redistribution connecting Western 
Europe with Afghanistan.
203
 The European Commission in its 2010 report also underlined that 
”Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a transit country for international trafficking of narcotics. 
Organized crime groups linked with drug trafficking continued to operate through its territo-
ry” and that “little progress was made in the fight against drugs.”204 The US Department of 
State in its 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy was a little less critical. It described 
Bosnia’s Border Police as “one of the more effective border services in Southeast Europe” 
and pointed out that Bosnia’s “law enforcement agencies made some significant drug – relat-
ed arrests during 2010.” 205 The police data suggest that in 2010 75,6 kg of heroin had been 
seized and 150,3 kg of marijuana.
206
 Yet, it did not seem to be enough. According to the re-
port, the “underfunding, lack of staffing, and ill-equipped BP and SIPA remain a challenge.” 
207
 Those shortcomings allowed drug lords to arrange “shipments of cocaine coming from Co-
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lombia” to Bosnia and left the country with many unsecured illegal border crossings.208 All in 
all, the report evaluated Bosnia’s efforts to fight narcotic trafficking as inadequate. It blamed 
“the weak state institution, lack of personnel in counternarcotics units, and imperfect coopera-
tion among the responsible authorities” as the main shortcomings.209 All of those elements 
were part of the EUPM program of strengthening law enforcement agencies; thus their inabil-
ity to function effectively signifies a failure of EUPM efforts. 
 
Human trafficking 
 
In the fight against human trafficking BiH also does not seem to fulfill the European 
Union’s expectations. The 2010 progress report estimated that the country “remains at an ear-
ly stage in the fight against trafficking of human beings” and that it “continues to be a country 
of origin, transit and destination for trafficking in women and girls.” 210 Unfortunately, instead 
of further improving the effectiveness of its law enforcement agencies and strengthening the 
cooperation between NGOs and public agencies in preventing human trafficking, Bosnia took 
a step backward. If in 2010 the US Department of State judged that the country “fully com-
plies with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. The government made 
clear progress in its anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts (…), employed proactive system-
atic procedures to identify potential victims”, in its 2012 report stated that the country “does 
not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking (and that the) 
government failed to demonstrate appreciable progress in its prosecution and protection ef-
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forts during the year.”211 Therefore, Bosnia, which in 2010 was placed by the US Department 
of State in TIER 1, a group of “Countries whose governments fully comply with the Traffick-
ing Victims Protection Act’s (TVPA) minimum standards”, in 2012 was moved back to TIER 
2, a group of ” Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the TVPA’s minimum 
standards, but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those 
standards.”212 
 
Table 3.: Tier Ranking by year, Bosnia and Herzegovina
213
 
 
 
 
Such a decline of standards and effectiveness in the fight against human trafficking 
should be considered as a failure of both Bosnia’s authorities and the EUPM, charged with 
supervising the country’s law enforcement agencies. 
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Corruption 
 
EUPM’s actions can be also evaluated based on the level of corruption among the po-
lice officers, as one of the missions goals was to tackle the problem of bribery. In 2004 a 
“study by Transparency International showed that BiH citizens perceive corruption as the se-
cond biggest problem in the country.”214 The corruption was especially widespread among 
police officers. Based on the surveys and interviews conducted between 2005 and 2006 
Dalzer, Muralbegovic, Maljevic and Budimlic estimated that “44.3% (of police officers) were 
familiar with cases of corruption in police (…) and altogether, over 50% of respondents were 
aware of corruption.”215 Since then not enough has changed. In 2006 Bosnia placed 93 in a 
Corruption Perception Index scoring 2.9 and in 2011 it placed 91
st
, whit a 3.2 score.
216
 The 
improvement, although visible, cannot be described as fully satisfying. According to the Eu-
ropean Commission in 2011 the corruption in BiH was still “prevalent in many areas and con-
tinues to be a serious problem, especially within government and other State and Entity struc-
tures, linked to public procurement, business licensing, in the health, energy, transportation 
infrastructure and education sectors.”217 In 2010 EuroActive warned that, based on the Gallup 
surveys, 81% of Bosnia’s citizens believed that the government was corrupt and that “more 
than a quarter of respondents (…) said they are personally affected by organized crime in their 
day-to-day life.”218 The level of corruption among the police officials can be partially blamed 
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on the EUPM. The mission was supposed to fight bribery among the local police, yet, due to 
the language barriers and short terms of service it was unable to tackle the problem. 
 
Who does the police serve? 
 
The EUPM was also unable to  achieve another of its goals - to “helped the police to 
develop its outreach activities and to raise its image, integrity and accountability towards the 
citizens through public information campaigns”.219 According to UNDP Early Warning Re-
port, “dissatisfaction with police assistance received was up in urban areas: up from 16.1% of 
the relevant sample in late 2007 to 27.2% in late 2008.  There was a similar increase in rural 
areas, up from 19.6% in November 2007 to 26.3% in November 2008.” On the other hand the 
growing dissatisfaction did not have to be a negative symptom, as it might have been a result 
of the rising awareness among Bosnia’s citizens regarding their rights. Moreover, in case of 
Republika Srpska, the police was perceived as a guardian of autonomy; the dissatisfaction 
there might have been in response to the changes within the police structures requested by the 
European Union. Yet, even if the results of the surveys are less alarming than one might think 
at first, they are still not satisfying. As Maljevic points out “it is often said that the police are a 
reflection of the state’s (im)proper functioning.”220 If so, Bosnia’s police clearly indicates that 
the state does not function the way it should.  
8. Summary 
 
As was argued above, the EUPM lacked visible achievements, especially regarding the 
police reform and fight against organized crime. Most of the scholars and international ob-
servers judge the mission’s presence in Bosnia as unsatisfying, pointing out its lack of a co-
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herent plan, weak mandate, under qualified staff and inconsistencies. As an example of EU 
double standards Celadors presents the problem of female police officers. The EU requested 
Bosnia to fulfill the requirement of a 10% female rate among police personnel, yet, the EUPM 
itself did not meet this standard.
221
 The British Institute of International and Comparative Law 
reminds that “although human rights and gender mainstreaming were two distinct areas of 
work there was only one Gender and Human Rights Advisor in EUPM.”222 Finally, Eralp 
summarize the EUPM presence on the ground by writing that the EU clearly showed that it 
was “not experienced in dealing with a post conflict country with complex, multiple layers of 
governance structure based on a delicate balance among the three constituent nations.”223  
Sadly, the list of EUPM achievements is incomparably shorter than the list of its fail-
ures. Juncos points out that “the EUPM managed to create at least an understanding of the 
need for intelligence in fighting  crime and a culture of exchanging intelligence among law 
enforcement agencies.”224 It also helped the EU to realize that in order to help the country 
with a transformation process Brussels needs to develop a coherent plan, coordinate actors’ 
presence on the ground and make them work with each other. EUPM and EUFOP Althea, as 
it will be argued later in the study, were perfect examples of a lack of cooperation between 
missions that should have worked together and complemented each other’s programs. In the 
opinion of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, the main achievement 
of the mission was that the “presence of so many international police officers in BiH helped to 
create a safe and secure environment.”225 A doubtful compliment taking into consideration 
that the EUPM mission has been present in Bosnia for the past nine years (and its mandate 
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will probably be extended) and that the total cost of the mission between 2002 and 2009 is 
estimated at 122.31 million euro.
226
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CHAPTER III. 
MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT MISSION. 
THE EVALUATION OF EUFOR ALTHEA 
 
 
The European Union Police Mission in Bosnia was the first, but not the only EU crisis 
management operation in the country. Already in 2002, during the Copenhagen Summit, 
Brussels expressed its willingness to deploy in Bosnia a military operation that would take 
over the responsibilities from NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR).227 As in case of the police 
mission the decision was “judged, particularly by the US and UK government as too prema-
ture”.228 A year later, in August 2003, NATO general, James Jones, confirmed this fear by 
stating that “EU troops (are) not ready to take on Bosnian role.”229 The US was mostly wor-
ried about the EU capability to fight terrorism, a problem that after the 2001 attacks on the 
World Trade Center, became one of Washington’s priorities. As one of the US officials stated 
in 2003: “Washington sees the (Balkan) region as increasingly important for counter-terrorism 
operations, and has been less enthusiastic about the EU's military ambitions”230 Despite US 
second thoughts regarding the reduction of its forces in the Balkans, during the 2004 NATO 
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Istanbul Summit, the alliance announced a willingness to terminate its SFOR operation.
231
 It 
also supported the EU decision to deploy its mission in the country.
232
 On 9 July, 2004, the 
UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1551, in which it also welcomed the EU follow-up 
mission.
233
 
Four months later, on 22 November, 2004, the UN adopted Resolution 1575, “defining 
EUFOR’s mandate for an initial 12 months as the legal successor to the Multinational Stabili-
zation Force (SFOR) led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).”234 As a result, 
on December 2, 2004, based on the EU council decision from November 25, 2004, Brussels 
launched in Bosnia the military operation EUFOR Althea.
235
 The decision was welcomed by 
Brussels with enthusiasm. Javier Solana called it an “important day” for the European Union 
and a “moving day” for the people of Bosnia.236 The day was especially important also be-
cause the EU was about to test itself again as a crisis manager. It is worth noticing that it had 
the bar set high by the previous NATO mission. During the press conference of December 2, 
2004, Secretary General of NATO, Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, called the terminating of the 
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SFOR operation a “great success”.237 Some of the international observers, following the alli-
ance’s optimism, were even describing the NATO operation a “mission accomplished.”238 
Although, the EU officials were more skeptical, pointing out that there was still much left to 
be done, they were well aware that EUFOR Althea’s actions would be judged in comparison 
to NATO’s SFOR.239 Thus, in order to evaluate the EU military mission in the country it is 
important to look closer at what had been done during the alliance’s nine years in Bosnia, and 
what Brussels was expected to deliver. 
 
1. IFOR and SFOR – NATO’s presence in Bosnia. 
 
In order to secure the situation in the post-war Bosnia and to ensure, that there would 
be no further outbreak of violence among the feuding parties, Annex 1-A of the Dayton Peace 
Accords was fully devoted to its military Aspects. The Agreement welcomed NATO- led Im-
plementation Force (IFOR) as a body supervising the implementation of the Annex 1-A. The 
soldiers were supposed to ensure that the cease-fire will continue and that the parties would 
withdraw forces and heavy weapons to their respective cantons. Moreover, IFOR was granted 
a “right to carry out its mission vigorously, including with the use of force as necessary (and) 
(…) unimpeded freedom of movement, control over airspace, and status of forces protec-
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tion.”240 In addition IFOR was charged with assisting the civilian authorities in searching for 
war crime suspects and helping with refugee resettlement.
241
  
IFOR consisted of  54,000 troops from all of the NATO members and 18 non- NATO 
states. When after a year the IFOR mandate came to an end the alliance decided that Bosnia 
was ready to move from the implementation to the stabilization phase. Thus, on the December 
12, 1996, under the UN Resolution 1088, IFOR was replaced by the Stabilization Force 
(SFOR). The new mission was established as a legal successor to IFOR and was also operat-
ing as a peace enforcement mission, under Chapter VII of the UN charter.
242
 The mission was 
significantly smaller than its predecessor and consisted of 32,000 troops. Its main goal was to 
“to provide a continued military presence in order to deter renewed hostilities, stabilize and 
consolidate the peace, and thus contribute to a secure environment and provide and maintain 
broad support for civil implementation plans.”243  Similarly to IFOR, SFOR was supposed to 
provide a “support for the civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement” and to take “an active 
role in efforts to return people to their prewar homes in areas controlled by another ethnic 
group, detain persons indicted for war crimes, (…) and to stop the flow of arms.”244  
As the United States Institute of Peace estimates, during the Bosnian war “approxi-
mately 100,000 people were killed, 1 million became refugees, and half the population was 
displaced.”245 Unfortunately, from the very beginning of its mandate SFOR did not undertake 
serious measures in protecting the refugees. It started to be on SFOR’s agenda not earlier than 
in 1999, yet, despite the delay, “there were many examples of SFOR units successfully 
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providing security to returnees.”246 As the British Institute of International and Cooperative 
Law points out “SFOR played a vital role in the return of refugees and displaced persons, in 
particular to areas of eastern Republika Srpska were some of the most odious war crimes had 
been committed and which were therefore considered impervious to return.”247 The table be-
low presents the number of minority returns in the years 1996 – 2006. 248 
 
Table 4. Minority Returns. 249 
 
 
 
Yet, despite SFOR’s efforts to minimalize the acts of aggression and violence against 
those who decided to return to their homes and despite its strong support for the repatriation 
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process, at the end of SFOR’s mandate “almost half of the refugees and displaced BiH citi-
zens were outside their prewar homes”250 
SFOR has also significantly contributed to the disarmament program. In 1998 it 
launched “Operation Harvest”, changed in 1999 into “Project Harvest”, aimed at gathering 
unregistered weapons and ammunition. In 2004, when handing over its responsibilities to 
EUFOR, SFOR was able to pride itself on destroying “20,000 illegally-held SALW [Small 
Arms and Light Weapons] and 7,500,000 rounds of ammunition”.251 Thus, the operation can 
be judged quite successful, especially since according to the Bonn International Center for 
Conversion (BICC) survey, “43 percent answered that voluntary weapons collection pro-
grams(i.e. Passive Harvest) had improved security in their local areas.”252 However  it did not 
mean that by the end of SFOR’s mandate the problem had been solved. BICC estimated that 
at the time when EUFOR was being deployed there was still between 248,381 and 494,252 
illegal weapons.
253
 
SFOR was also able to “detain approximately 27 persons indicated for war crimes”.254 
Moreover it significantly contributed to securing the situation in postwar Bosnia. In accord-
ance with BICC surveys conducted in 2004, “Most respondents felt fairly safe in their neigh-
borhoods with 54 percent of all respondents claiming that the situation had improved since the 
end of the war.”255 
For EUFOR the results of SFOR mission had various consequences. On the one hand 
SFOR left the country far more stable than it was right after the war; thus, the EU mission did 
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not have to undertake any serious military measures and was able to work in a quite stable 
environment. On the other hand, the situation in Bosnia was still far from satisfying, yet, as 
the most visible and easier to tackle problems had been already solved, the EU was left with 
the difficult and unrewarding process of further stabilizing the country. Moreover, its actions 
were being judged in comparison to the earlier SFOR successes.   
 
2. From SFOR to EUPM. 
 
When in 2004 Brussels deployed its military crisis management mission in Bosnia it needed 
to both, maintain continuity with the earlier NATO mission and legitimize its presence by propos-
ing a new approach to the country’s changing problems. The High Representative for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Paddy Ashdown, explained the transition between NATO and EU by using a medi-
cal metaphor. He stated that “BiH was out of “emergency surgery” following the end of its  war, 
with a major emphasis on NATO’s military stabilization to create the conditions for civilian re-
construction. It was now in ‘rehabilitation’ with the main emphasis on civilian institution building 
supported by military and security reassurance. Nevertheless, a robust international military pres-
ence was still necessary to guarantee Bosnia’s stability.”256 
Understandably, if the EU was to serve as Bosnia’s rehabilitant it needed to have a full in-
sight into the country’s medical record. Thus, when preparing its mission, Brussels “relied largely, 
on the knowledge and assessments of NATO’s SFOR, which had acquired an invaluable under-
standing of the Bosnian theatre since its deployment there at the end of 1995.”257 The close coop-
eration between NATO and EU was visible from the very beginning, when EUFOR Althea was 
first announced to be established within the framework of the “Berlin Plus Agreements”. The 
agreements, reached on the 17 December, 2003, facilitated “EU access to NATO planning, NATO 
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European command options and use of NATO assets and capabilities.”258 Unquestionably, the 
possibility to draw on NATO knowledge allowed the EU, which lacked expertise in most of the 
military strategies and actions, to plan and conduct a mission that was not doomed to fail-
ure.
259
 One of the EU officials who worked on creating the Operational Plan (OPLAN) for 
Bosnia evaluates the transition between SFRO and EUFOR as very satisfying. He recalls that 
“the (operational) planning process was very, very comfortable; we had the transition plan 
from SFOR and I had the whole SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) at 
my disposal; I had Naples, I had the SFOR FHQ. It was a piece of cake. Berlin Plus works 
perfectly well, as long as you stay within the box, that is. It is perfect on the technical side: it 
is the best planning and conduct option the EU has by far.”260 
 On the other hand, some scholars have argued that the Berlin Plus Agreement uncov-
ered the EU’s inability to conduct a military mission and made it clear that without NATO 
EUFOR Althea would never be a success.
261
 As one of the EU officials argued, “Operation 
Althea is completely dependent on NATO’s assets for CIS (Communication and Information 
Systems) functionality. The EUFOR relies on NATO for communications, from the OHQ 
down to Naples and Sarajevo.”262 This critique does not seem entirely fair. It is possible to 
argue that EU honestly judged its defects and in order to deliver the best military crisis man-
agement mission possible, it decided to fix its shortcomings with a help from a more experi-
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enced player.
263
 From Bosnia’s perspective it matters less who provides the assistance than 
the quality of the assistance itself. Thanks to EU – NATO cooperation the country received 
more valuable help than it would have if Brussels had been the only one to plan the mission.  
 
3. The structure of EUFOR Althea 
 
In order to provide a smooth transition between SFOR and EUFOR missions Brussels 
decided to set up its headquarters in Sarajevo, in the same building SFOR occupied for nine 
years and in which NATO, after SFOR termination, decided to keep its HQ. 
264
 Thus, as 
Thomas Bertin argues, “the EU Planning Team, which set up camp inside SFOR headquarters 
(HQ) in June 2004, benefited from significant support from its NATO colleagues. The good 
working relationship contributed to the fact that EUFOR was ready to take over from SFOR 
as scheduled on 2 December 2004.”265  
The smooth transition was also secured by that fact that 80% of the SFOR troops were 
European, thus, when EU took over it had most of its men and women already on the 
ground.
266
 In the opinion of the British Institute of the Comparative Law, it “ensured a certain 
degree of continuity.”267 The continuity was also provided by the fact that EU troops, just as 
NATO’s, were divided into three Multinational Task Forces (MTF) and located in the three 
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main regions of the country. Accordingly around 1,300 troops of Multi-National Task Force 
(North) were based in Tuzla, 1,000 members of Multi- National Task Force (North West) 
were based in Banja Luka, and 1,400 members of Multi-National Task Force (South East) 
were based in Mostar.
268
 In Sarajevo there were stationed around 500 officers and another 
2,000 were “spread across various locations throughout BiH in Liaison and Observation 
Teams (LOTs).”269  
In 2007, with the reduction of the troops (from around 7,000 to 2,000), the EU decided 
also to restructure the mission. The three Multinational Task Forces were closed down and 
instead the EU established one Multinational Maneuver Battalion of Camp Butmir in Saraje-
vo.
270
 The Battalion was comprised of troops from Austria, Hungary and Turkey. The EU de-
cided to leave the Integrated Police Unit (IPU), charged with supporting “the implementation 
of civilian aspects of the General Framework Agreement of Peace, in accordance with 
EUFOR tasks.”271 Another component of the mission were the Liaison and Observation 
Teams (LOTs), but their size was also significantly reduced - from around 44 LOTs com-
posed of 2000 staff in 2004 to “29 LOTs with a composition of two to ten members” in 2011. 
272
 
From the very beginning Althea had a clear chain of command. The Council of The 
European Union was responsible for launching and extending the mission after approving its 
Operational Plan (OPLAN) and the Rules of Engagement (RoE). It could also, with assistance 
of EU Special Representative (EUSR) (serving also as a High Representative (HR)) decide on 
the goals of the mission as well as its termination. The next in line was the EU’s Political and 
Security Committee (PSC), which “exercises the political control and strategic direction of the 
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operation, under the responsibility of the Council”.273 The responsibility of controlling the 
implementation of the mission was granted to the EU Military Committee (EUMC). Finally 
the commander of the mission received support “of the EU OHQ at SHAPE, again under the 
Berlin Plus arrangement”274 
In regards to the budget of the mission it had been decided that Althea’s cost will be 
“administered by the "ATHENA" mechanism (contributions by Member States on a GDP-
based key to finance costs of EU operations having military or defense implications).”275 The 
total cost of the operation in years 2005-2007 had been estimated at  76.280.000 €.276 Aware 
of the possible extra costs of the operation the Commission of the European Union decided 
that in financing the mission it would follow the principle that "costs lie where they fall."
277
  
At the beginning of the mission, the main challenge for Brussels was to find replace-
ment for the US troops, who served as the framework nation for Task Force North. It was an 
important challenge as “a framework nation supplied the majority of the officers 
manning an HQ as well as the key command and control capabilities such as 
communication and information systems.”278 Finally it was Finland wich decided to take 
over the responsibilities.
279
 The decision was quite understandable, taking under consideration 
that Helsinki, during the Finnish presidency in the EU in 1999, was responsible for speeding 
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up the development of the ESDP. The Task Force North- West was led by British and the 
Task Force South – East, by the Spanish.280 
All in all, the EU was able to deploy its mission without any serious problems or de-
lays. The British Institute for Cooperative Law judged that “in general the transition from 
SFOR to EUFOR appears to be a considerably less contentious and criticized process than the 
transition of UN IPTF to EUPM.”281 On the other hand, the price paid for the smooth transi-
tion was a lack of clear distinction between the NATO and EU missions. Just like in case of 
EUPM, the fact that the staff did not change simultaneously with the change of missions was 
confusing for both international and local observers. Moreover, both of the missions had HQ 
in the same building, thus “the distinction between SFOR and EUFOR had not been very 
clear for the Bosnian public.”282 Also the fact that NATO did not fully withdraw from Bosnia 
after SFOR termination further strengthen the confusion. Nevertheless,  taken as a whole the 
transition between SFOR and EUFOR should be assessed positively. Yet, it is important to 
state that it is so largely due to NATO’s efforts. EU was evidently a less experienced military 
crisis manger than NATO. The difference between EU and NATO abilities to plan and con-
duct military operations was best seen when Brussels was about to set the goals for EUFOR 
Althea.  
 
4. The goals of the mission. 
 
When Brussels was deploying its EUFOR Althea mission, the situation in Bosnia was al-
ready stable. Thus, many scholars argue that from the theoretical point of view, Althea was a 
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peacekeeping operation.283 Its main role was to build on NATO’s achievements and bring Bosnia 
closer to becoming a sustainable country. It was also supposed to serve as an important element of 
an EU holistic approach to the country’s problems. As “Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of 
12 July 2004 on the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina” stated, “the 
operation should reinforce the EU's comprehensive approach towards BiH, and support BiH's 
progress towards EU integration by its own efforts, with the objective of the signing of a Stabili-
zation and Association Agreement as a medium-term objective.”284 
Under the UN Security Council Resolution (2004) 1575 Althea was given quite a robust 
mandate and was presented to the public as SFOR’s successor. Yet, due to the already stable sit-
uation on the ground “ many observers expected it to play more of a policing role – assisting 
the Bosnian authorities with countering organized crime for example – relative to the predom-
inantly military deterrence role played by SFOR.”285 US politicians were especially keen on 
limiting Althea’s military actions. It was partially dictated by Washington’s fear that the EU 
would try to compete with NATO for the role of a main military player in the international 
arena. Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defense, openly stated that Washington ex-
pected Althea to be “distinctly different mission’ from SFOR, one that would be ‘less military 
and more police in its orientation.’”286 
Brussels too was well aware of the fact that Althea’s role in Bosnia should be quite 
different than that of SFOR. As in the case of many other military operations, the tasks of the 
EUFOR mission were divided into key military and key supporting tasks, with the former being 
“those to which commander has to give priority” and the latter being “activities which he may 
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decide to carry out, within the constraints of available means and capabilities, on the condition 
that such pursuit contributes to the accomplishment of the main military mission”. 287  In accord-
ance with this division Althea’s key military tasks were “to provide deterrence and continued 
compliance with the responsibility to fulfill the role specified in Annexes 1A and 2 of the 
Dayton/Paris Agreement (General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH) and  
to contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH (SASE), in line with its mandate, and to 
achieve core tasks in the OHR's Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) and the Stabilization and 
Association Process (SAP).”288 Moreover it was charged with conducting “information opera-
tions (INFO OPS) in support of the EU political objectives” and managing “any residual as-
pects of the DPA including airspace management, advice on de-mining and ordnance dispos-
al, and weapon collection programs.”289 
The key supporting tasks were to “provide support to the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and relevant authorities, including the detention of 
PIFWCs; provide the security environment in which the police can act against the organized 
criminal network.”290 Although, the tasks sounded quite reasonable on paper, in practice they 
proved not to be fully planned.  
The mission’s first commander, Major General David Leakey, wrote in 2005 for the Cen-
ter For Security Studies, ETH Zurich an extensive analysis in which he pointed out all the mis-
takes of the first year of the mission. Leakey recalls that the only guidance he received from Javier 
Solana about how to conduct the mission was that it should “make a difference” and be “new and 
distinct.” 291 Although he later describes this suggestion as “pertinent” it is hard not to agree that a 
commander of the EU military crisis management mission should be able to expect a more com-
plex and well considered guidance from a Secretary General and High Representative for EU 
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CFSP. Leakey was also quite surprised to hear that one of his key military, not supporting tasks, 
was to “support High Representative’s Mission Implementation Plan” (MIP).292 In order to fulfill 
this duty, he was trying to find in the MIP an area in which Althea would be able to support OHR. 
As he recalls “the MIP was in four sections dealing respectively with the economy, the rule of 
law, the police, and defense reform. The first two seemed unlikely for military engagement. The 
police section seemed to be more properly a concern of the EU Police Mission. Finally, assisting 
the Defense Reform process was the main role for the small residual NATO presence in BiH.”293 
Leakey’s revelation clearly presents the EU’s lack of a carefully thought out plan for its presence 
on the ground. If not for Leakey’s personal willingness to find for Althea a niche were it would be 
able to present its capabilities, the mission might as well have served only as a dummy of the EU 
military crisis management operation.  
In Leakey’s opinion supporting the MIP (and keeping the peace) and fighting against or-
ganized crime “were two sides of the same coin” and thus, he decided to put most of Althea’s ef-
fort into supporting the local agencies in the fight against organized crime.294 He also argued that 
by doing so he was providing support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia (ICTY), as most of the fugitives were being protected by those involved in the criminal 
networks. Thus, his goal was to send the war criminals a clear message, that “they run a serious 
risk of being caught if they are in Bosnia.”295 Although it is hard to evaluate the real impact of the 
EUFOR Althea’s action on the criminal network, especially in regards to the war criminals, it is 
true that two of the most wanted fugitives, Radko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic were captured 
not in Bosnia, but in Serbia, where they were thought to be living for years before the arrests.296  
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Despite the fact that EUFOR Althea was granted an executive mandate Brussels expected 
the mission not to fight the organize crime itself, but only to support the local agencies. Following 
this logic Leakey wanted his soldiers to “create the conditions in which the BiH law enforcement 
agencies not only ‘could’ but ‘would have to’ do their duty.”297 He also wanted to help Bosnians 
to “tackle some of the ‘untouchables’” – people, who due to their financial or political status were 
difficult for the local agencies to arrest.298 Despite Brussels’ suggestion to limit the mission’s in-
volvement on the ground, Leakey openly wanted Althea to present a hands-on-approach, promot-
ing active participation in solving Bosnia’s problems. Thus, as Stefano Recchia notes „during its 
first year of operations, EUFOR has participated in or directly conducted several high-profile op-
erations against organized crime in Bosnia through its Integrated Police Unit (IPU).”299 Obvious-
ly, EUFOR’s interpretation of its mandate significantly differed from EUPM’s rather narrow in-
terpretation of its role. In effect during the first year on the ground the military mission was in 
constant opposition to the civilian one, and instead of cooperating they were struggling over com-
petencies. Despite some of its flaws, it was EUFOR Althea that proved to be more active and ef-
fective than EUPM. Convinced of this supremacy, Leakey in 2005 called “the first year of 
EUFOR [a] multi-dimensional success story” and boldly stated that “it is beyond doubt that 
EUFOR established itself as the military force in charge in BiH and continued to be at least as 
militarily effective as its predecessor NATO forces.”300 More skeptical about the mission itself, 
but highly fond of Leakey, Brickenton summarize the first year of EUFOR Althea by writing that 
“what was portrayed as an instance of the EU’s unique ‘holistic’ approach to the post – conflict 
stabilization and development was in fact a pragmatic response by commanders on the ground, 
forced to fill in their own mandates as their orders from above were little more than ‘do something 
new’.”301  
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All in all, in years 2004-2005 EUFOR Althea did surprisingly well, taking into considera-
tion the poor guidance it received from Brussels. The mission successfully took over from SFOR, 
and avoided “security gap”, conducted several operations, launched a “wide-ranging information 
campaign (that) ensured EUFOR’s visibility throughout BiH” and “provided continued deterrence 
and reassurance.”302 Yet, due to the mission’s conflict with EUPM, Brussels decided in 2005 to 
reformulate Althea’s goals and redefine its role as a component of the EU “holistic approach to 
Bosnia. 
 
5. Military vs. civilian. The redefined goals of Althea. 
 
From the very beginning the relations between EUFOR Althea and EUPM were quite dif-
ficult. The bone of contention was the fight against organized crime – one of the goals of EUPM, 
which later became also an important element in EUFOR’s agenda. In the opinion of many EUPM 
officers by getting involved in the fight against organized crime EUFOR over interpreted its man-
date.Moreover, in the opinion of many police officers “EUFOR was interfering with EUPM man-
date” and “stepping onto civilian turf.” 303 EUPM was also dissatisfied with EUFOR’s hands-on-
approach, arguing that “by participating actively in operations against organized crime, the 
EUFOR was actually doing the locals’ job.”304 Indeed, many scholars argue that Leakey interpret-
ed its mandate too liberally and that he was carrying out various anti criminal operations without 
informing either  EUPM or local police units.305 Althea on the other hand was dissatisfied with 
EUPM’s narrow interpretation of its already weak mandate. It accused the police mission of “ne-
glecting the fight against organized crime” and was argued that EUPM “promotes long-term ca-
pacity-building and ownership” of the local agencies only in order to hide its inability to act on 
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more concrete problems.306 This perception was also widely shared among other local and interna-
tional actors on the ground. As the British Institute for Cooperative Law states, “many interview-
ees from outside EUPM remarked that the involvement in the fight against organized crime during 
2004-2005 was necessary due to both the limitations of the BiH law enforcement agencies and the 
inability of EUPM-I to coordinate the activities among the various agencies involved.”307 
The differences between EUPM’s and EUFOR’s interpretation of the EU’s involvement in 
Bosnia were also visible in the mission attitude towards Bosnians themselves. According to the 
interviews conducted by Penksa with the staff of both the military and civilian missions, “EUPM 
officials were told to increase their trust of local police and transfer more authority to the locals, 
while EUFOR officers were given the message that the local police were not to be trusted.”308 
Predictably it resulted in growing disagreements between the two missions, giving Bosnians the 
impression that the EU had no coherent plan and that it was internally divided. Therefore, the con-
flict between EUPM and EUFOR was undermining Bosnia’s trust and respect for Brussels, seri-
ously jeopardizing the EU’s efforts to reform the country. 
Understandably, EU officials quickly decided to solve the problem. On 13th September 
2005 EU formulated the so - called Seven Principles which were to govern the relationship be-
tween military and civilian crisis management missions. They also helped to clerify what kind of 
engagement in BiH the EU was looking for. Although it was EUFOR, which had more successes 
on the ground than EUPM, Brussels clearly stated that “the local police ownership of operations 
regardless of their operational effectiveness is ABSOLUTELY CRITICAL” and thus decided 
to strengthen the EUPM role at the expense of the EUFOR’s mandate.309  
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In line with the “Seven Principles for Co-ordination” and later agreed “General Guide-
lines for Increasing Co-operation between EUPM-EUFOR and EUSR” “the EUPM (…) (was 
to) take the lead in the policing aspects of the ESDP-supporting efforts in tackling organized 
crime. The EUPM would assist the local authorities by mentoring and monitoring the plan-
ning of these operations, while EUFOR would provide the operational capabilities to these 
operations, all under the political co-ordination of the EUSR.”310 At the same time, in 2006 
Brussels started to refocus EUPM’s mandate by strengthening its role in the fight against or-
ganized crime. As Juncos argued it also reflected the EU decision to reduce EUFOR engage-
ment in Bosnia.
311
 This notion was quite understandable, taking under consideration the fact 
that Bosnia already had passed an immediate post – war stabilization phase and needed civil-
ian guidance rather than military help. Surely this does not mean that after its first year 
EUFOR was pushed aside. It was still engaged in many operations, including searching for 
war fugitives and fighting organized crime, but its actions were supposed to be subordinated 
to those of EUPM. As the “Guidelines for Increasing Co-operation between EUPM-EUFOR 
and EUSR” suggested “the initiative to launch crime-busting operations lied with the local 
law enforcement agencies. Should a law enforcement agency judge that it needs EUFOR’s 
support to conduct an operation, its request must be reviewed and endorsed by the EUPM.”312 
Moreover “EUFOR also worked very closely with the EUSR, even though the EUSR was not 
formally part of EUFOR’s chain-of-command.”313 
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On the December 11, 2006, The Council of the European Union agreed to further re-
define its military crisis management mission.
314
 Following this decision, on the February 27, 
2007, the Council adopted a revised Operations Plan (OPLAN) for EUFOR Althea.
315
 Within 
6 months the mission was downsized to 2,500 staff from 22 states. Great Britain decided to 
withdraw almost all of its soldiers. Germany and Italy opposed this notion and became the 
two most engaged contributors. All in all, the restructuring of the mission was conducted very 
ably – “The implementation of the first phase of the transition, (i.e. reconfiguration and reduc-
tion) of EUFOR, started on 28 February and was completed on 28 April, ahead of sched-
ule.”316  
The structural changes reduced the mission capabilities and thus gave it a new, less ac-
tive role within the Bosnian society. Since 2007 “the EUFOR presence in BiH was (…) about 
providing psychological reassurance as the country moved from the post – conflict stage to 
the democratic transition stage.”317 The Althea’s role as a symbol of security is best portrayed 
by the surveys conducted by the UNDP among the Bosnian society. For example in 2007 Ear-
ly Warning Reports UNDP writes that “the tense political situation was reflected in the con-
siderable rise in the percentage who believe that the withdrawal of EUFOR might reopen the 
possibility of war, up 11% amongst Bosniaks, 7% amongst Croats. The RS result was down 
on a year ago.”318 Also due to the 2009 Early Warning System EUFOR was still playing a re-
assurance role, as the belief that the “war could break out after the withdrawal of EUFOR has 
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been constantly growing over the past two years. In September 2008 the number was 17%, 
whereas in November 2009 it had risen to 25%.”319 
The mission was further transformed in 2010. Aware of the EUFOR’s symbolical role 
and at the same time eager to slowly terminate the mission, “on 25 October 2010, the Council 
of the EU confirmed the EU's commitment to a continuing executive military role to support 
Bosnia and Herzegovina's efforts to maintain the safe and secure environment, under a re-
newed UN mandate; and, building on Althea's achievements, to the continuing provision of 
non-executive capacity-building and training support in order to contribute to strengthening 
local ownership and capacity.”320 The new, non-executive dimension of Althea emphasized 
Brussels’ willingness to transform the mission into less a military and more civilian one, with 
reassuring, mentoring and training tasks. As Janik Knauer argued in 2011 “this new dimen-
sion that aims at enhancing the local ownership and autonomy of the BiH authorities might 
well be the next step towards a major restructuring or even (…) conclusion of the opera-
tion.”321 Yet, despite these predictions, the Council of the EU announced in 2011 that the 
“CSDP missions, namely the EU Police Mission (EUPM) and EUFOR ALTHEA,  (are)  important 
elements of its overall strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina.”322 The chances for a total withdrawal 
of EUFOR Althea forces are rather slight. Especially, as Martina Fisher once sarcastically 
pointed out in her commentary to the EU involvement in Bosnia, “most assessments draw the 
paradoxical conclusion that the intervention has been sufficiently successful to be worth con-
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tinuing, but not successful enough to allow Bosnia to take charge of its own destiny.”323 It 
seems that in 2012 those words still apply. 
 
6. Did Althea heal Bosnia? 
 
Unlike in the case of EUPM, most of the scholars and international observers evalu-
ates the EUFOR Althea performance positively. For example Daniel Keohane argues that 
“EUFOR Althea has been a very successful peacekeeping operation.”324 Also Annmarie Rodt 
stated that “Althea has until now been successful in its external goal attainment” and that it 
“has done far more good than harm in BiH.”325 Indeed, despite some of its flaws, the mission 
was able to achieve many of its goals and conduct various victorious operations.  
 
a. Disarmament 
 
Since its deployment EUFOR Althea had become actively engaged in disarmament 
projects and activities focused on gaining control over small arms and light weapons 
(SALW). Most notably it continued SFOR’s “Operation Harvest” aimed at collecting weap-
ons from Bosnia’s citizens. The goal of the operation was to encourage people to voluntarily 
hand over their weapons, in exchange for a guarantee that they would not face any conse-
quences for their earlier possession. EUFOR divided the operation into three phases – in the 
first one soldiers were announced in the villages that arms would be collected on a certain day 
so everyone could drop off unwanted weapons. During the second phase, so called “door-to 
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door”, EUFOR asked in every household if the family had any weapons it would like to turn 
in. Finally, the last phase, called “information – based”, was conducted by LOTs, which after 
receiving information about alleged possession of arms conducted raids on the indicated 
houses.
326
  Already in December 2004 EUFOR’s MTF South-East together with Bosnia’s Po-
lice authorities took over SFOR’s “door-to- door” operation, called  “Operation Free Entrance 
11.” As a result of the operation “two-hundred and eight small arms, 1,055 hand grenades, 
193 rifle grenades, 8 anti-personnel mines, 76,502 rounds of ammunition, 79 anti-tank rockets 
and 119kg of TNT were collected.”327 
A year later, in February and March 2005 EUFOR launched in the area of Sarajevo 
“Operation Free Entrance 12.” Throughout the operation “more than 243,000 rounds of am-
munition, about 3,900 hand grenades, 658 small arms, 167 rifle grenades, 17 rockets and 40kg 
of bulk explosive” had been collected.328 It is worth mentioning that the operation should be 
considered a success not only due to the large amount of seized weapons, but also because 
Althea was able to persuade the local authorities, police forces and Republika Srpska officials 
to became actively engaged in the operation.  
Later on, Operation Harvest was complemented with the Operation Harvest Plus, 
aimed at seizing illegally possessed weapons. From 2005 to 2006,  in accordance with  
“EUFOR reports (…) 2,500 weapons have been collected and destroyed as a result of Opera-
tion Harvest.”329 Moreover, in accordance to the 2006 South East Europe SALW monitor, 
EUFOR was also actively engaged in the destruction programs. In 2006 it helped to establish 
a new site for weapons destruction at the BiH Ministry of Defense’s ‘GOF 18’ factory.330 
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Taking  into consideration the overall seizure and destruction of the SALW, Austrian Armed 
Forces, evaluated that “Operation Harvest led by SFOR and EUFOR is considered to be one 
of the most successful SALW destruction campaigns in the Balkans. The total number of 
SALW destroyed in all three destruction processes during the reviewing period 2003 to Au-
gust 2006  amounts to 107,049 pieces.”331 
Although those numbers are definitely impressive, they do not mean that the situation 
in Bosnia regarding the possession of small arms is satisfying. Unfortunately, EUFOR’s work 
can be considered an uphill struggle. The UNDP 2010-2011 Small Arms Survey estimated 
that in 2011 there were “1,224,142 individual weapons in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 1,098,762 
pieces were in civilian possession.”332 In accordance with the collected data every third per-
son possessed a weapon in their household and every fifth citizen was an owner of an illegal 
firearm.
333
 Such a number of guns can be easily explained by historical and modern processes. 
First of all, during the era of Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia “Bosnia was 
home to more than 40 per cent of the federal republic’s defense industry, employing some 
38,000 workers. The bulk of SFYR (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)  small arms 
production took place in Bosnia.”334 With the outbreak of war in 1992, weapons obviously 
became highly desirable possessions. The embargo put on Former Yugoslavia by the UN Se-
curity Council in 1991, instead of reducing the flaw of armaments only contributed to the 
flourishing of a black market. The criminal networks established between 1992 – 1995 be-
came after the war an important part of Bosnia’s political and economic life. Among other 
illicit activities they are responsible for weapons trafficking. Thus, thanks to the criminal net-
works operating throughout Bosnia, weapons in the country are easily accessible on the black 
                                                 
331
 Erwin Kauer, “Weapons Collection and Destruction Programmes 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in: Small arms – big problems: A global threat to peace, security and development, 
ed. Peter Hazdra, Vienna, 2007 (Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie; 5/2007), p. 92. 
332
 UNDP, Small Arms Survey 2010-2011, UNDP, 2011, p. 5. Accessed July 12 2012,   
http://www.undp.ba/upload/publications/Small%20Arms%20Survey%202010-2011.pdf  
333
 UNDP, Small Arms Survey 2010-2011…p. 5. 
334
 Graduate Institute of International Studies Geneva, Small arms survey 2003, development denied,  (Oxford 
University Press, 2003), p. 43. 
95 
 
market.  In 2011 Bosnian could purchase a rifle on black market for as little as 300 BAM. For 
the same rifle in Austria he would have to pay 4,300 BAM.
335
  
On the other hand it is important to remember that in 2006 EUFOR successfully hand-
ed over the responsibilities of weapons collection to the local agencies.
336
 This decision was 
in line with the  EU’s need to strengthen the local ownership and instead of solving problems 
for Bosnian teach them how to solve the problems by themselves. Thus, the statistics present-
ed by UNDP do not reflect EUFOR’s lack of engagement or inability to decrease the number 
of weapons, but rather the local agencies’ shortcomings. 
 
b. Organized crime 
 
The vast amount of illegal weapons and their accessibility for regular citizens was 
strictly connected with  another of Bosnia’s problems – the widespread network of organized 
crime. As was presented earlier in the study, from the very first day as an EUFOR Althea 
commander, Leakey knew that in order to secure the country he had to first target those in-
volved in the illicit activities. Therefore, already in January 2005 EUFOR launched Operation 
Spring Clean, aimed at “supporting local authorities and the local police in their fight against 
organized crime and corruption.”337 The operation was focused mostly on preventing the traf-
ficking of weapons and illegal fuel and was later followed by several similar operations.
338
 
Unfortunately, the operation has been classified, which means that there are no data or opera-
tional details available for the public.
339
 EUFOR was also responsible for addressing a prob-
lem of illegal timber trade – an important element of the organized crime network in Bosnia. 
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Thanks to EUFOR’s efforts a vast number of logs has been confiscated.340 Moreover , as 
Briton rightly points out “Althea’s proactive stance made a difference to the prevailing culture 
of impunity in which organized crime flourishes.” Althea helped the local agencies to address 
the problems and then became actively engaged in solving them. Despite many critical voices 
that Althea was doing the job of locals, it in fact did significantly contribute to “developing 
local capacities, changing local perceptions” and supporting local ownership.341 
 
c. De-mining process 
 
Althea was also actively engaged, especially after it was downsized in 2007, in the ac-
tions aimed at raising the local population’s awareness of mines and unexploded explosive 
ordnance (UXO). In 2011 the European Parliament in its report on the Progress of Mine Ac-
tion “Applauded EUFOR Althea and its Mines Risk Education Instructors for having provid-
ed training to several thousands of people, and encourages them to continue their efforts.”342 
In October 2011 “Mines Information Coordination Cell (MICC) of Headquarters EUFOR in 
cooperation with NGO “Stop Mines” organized a five-day MRE (Mine Risk Education) In-
structor course (…)in Camp Butmir”343 EUFOR was charged with supporting the de-mining 
process from the very beginning of its deployment. Just after the war in Bosnia “international 
agencies (…) estimated that there were more than 4,200 square kilometers of minefields in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina – meaning that some 8.2 percent of the country’s total territory was 
mined. According to available records at the time, there were nearly 20,000 minefields, which 
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was considered to be approximately 50-60 percent of the real number.”344 Predictably such an 
intensity of mines resulted in a high rate of casualties: “according to the Red Cross figures, 
4,866 individuals were killed or injured by mines or unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, 1,520 since the end of the war.”345 Thanks to a series of de-mining actions, 
including those of an educational character, such as EUFOR’s MRE training, the number of 
casualties caused by mines has been decreasing every year. The table above present the num-
ber of mine casualties in the years 2008 -2011. 
 
Table5: Mine casualties in Bosnia - Herzegovina in years. 
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Moreover, between 1995 and 2010 the international and local organizations were able to re-
duce the number of minefields. If just after the war minefields covered approximately 8 per 
cent of the country’s territory, in 2010 it was only 3.04 per cent.347 
Surely, the demining process is not solely EUFOR’s achievements. Many other organ-
izations and agencies have been involved in the action. Most notable are UNMASA (United 
Nations Mine Action Service), OSCE, NATO, BiH Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA), Bosnia 
and Herzegovina Mine Action Service. Thus, EUFOR has to share the successes of reducing 
the contaminated areas with other players. It does not mean though that its work is less valua-
ble. As the Commission of the European Union decided when deploying its military mission, 
one of EUFOR’s tasks was to provide “advice on de-mining”348 Althea did meet Brussels’ 
expectations.  
 
d. Providing secure environment 
 
The missions achievements should not only be measured by the projects it launched. 
One of the main goals of the mission was to “ provide a continued military presence in order 
to deter renewed hostilities, stabilize and consolidate the peace, and thus contribute to a se-
cure environment.”349 In 2004, nine years after the war with a constant presence of NATO 
forces, the situation in Bosnia regarding the ethnic violence could have been considered sta-
ble. Surely, there were cases of aggression, especially concerning the returnees, yet those 
were rather individual incidents. Thus, in many cases the simple presence of EU military 
forces was enough to secure the situation, allow people not to feel threatened and contribute 
to a safe return of those displaced during the war. According to the Commission for Human 
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Rights of the Council of Europe in 2010, the “hostile reactions and acts of violence against 
returnees, who are members of minorities in their place of return, have reportedly dimin-
ished”, taking into consideration the number from previous years.350 According to an Amnes-
ty International report on violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “in one year, 290 minority-
return related violent incidents were reported between August 2000 and August 2001 across 
the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. One hundred and ninety-three of them occurred in the RS, 
according to the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF).”351 Yet, in 2011 The 
Council of European Union recorded between “November 2010-April (…) (only) 28 such in-
cidents. The Council found that almost all cases occurred in communities where the religious 
ethnic group represents a minority – attacks are in fact aimed at minority returnee 
groups/communities.”352 This data clearly shows that the presence of international military 
forces, first SFOR and later EUFOR, did contribute to the significant decrease in the act of 
violence against minorities. 
Yet despite a quite secure environment the rate of returns remains low. The Internal 
Displaced Monitoring Center estimated that in 2011 around 113,000 people still remained in-
ternally displaced. The low rate of returns is mostly caused by the bad economic situation of 
the displaced people, lack of proper education and programs supporting those who decide to 
return, lack of reintegrating programs etc.
353
 On the other hand, when evaluating EUFOR’s 
contribution to the refugee return process, it is important to understand that the EU military 
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mission was responsible purely for removing the threat of violent attacks. It is not responsible 
for a current economic, social and educational situation of the returnees. 
EUFOR’s presence contributed not only to securing the minorities, but also to the gen-
eral reducing the risk of violent clashes. As “a local faith leader felt (…) EUFOR was a posi-
tive presence in the country, because ‘incidents that could spill over and have greater conse-
quences could not happen, because we still have the international community’.”354   Also sur-
veys conducted among the Bosnia’s citizens “show that (EUFOR) enjoys a high level of sup-
port, comparable to that of SFOR. More than two-thirds of the population regard EUFOR as 
credible and useful.”355 Moreover, it is important to note that in 2011 in the opinion of many 
Bosnians “an international security presence had been invaluable immediately after the war, 
(but) EUFOR’s current role in their daily security at a local level was negligible.”356 This 
widely spread opinion, although on first glance seems to be unfavorable towards Althea, can 
be in fact treated as a compliment for the EU military mission. It shows that most of the Bos-
nians no longer perceive violence as the main threat to their lives. They are more concerned 
about the country’s economic situation, unemployment, standards of education etc. Thus, it 
appears, that the situation in Bosnia is stable enough to allow people not to worry about their 
lives, but about their standard of leaving. 
Finally, EUFOR should be applauded also for the successful handing over of respon-
sibilities for its military bases to Bosnia’s authorities. Already in 2007 the mission transferred 
“the army bases in Banja Luka, Tuzla and Mostar to BiH military authorities”357 Also UNDP 
in its 2010 Early Warning System evaluates that “Cooperation between EUFOR and the BiH 
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Armed Forces has been assessed as excellent. (…) EUFOR transferred civil control over the 
transportation of arms to the BiH government and to the Armed Forces of BiH.”358 
 
7. Summary. EUFOR Althea vs. EUPM. 
 
Unquestionably, taking into consideration EUFOR’s achievements the EU military 
mission seems to be much more successful than the civilian one. The question arises why this 
is so? 
First of all it should be pointed out that “with respect to its objectives and timeframe 
the EUFOR mandate was a lot less precise than the mandate of the European Union Police 
Mission.”359 Thus, the military mission was more able to adjust its goals to its capabilities 
than the civilian one.  
Moreover, it can be argued that stabilizing the peace and providing a secure environ-
ment is easier than changing peoples’ mentality and reforming the country. In other words, 
EUFOR Althea needed to deal much less with locals than EUPM. It was providing help from 
the outside, whereas the police mission needed to provide the support inside the Bosnian soci-
ety. Furthermore, when EUFOR stepped in, it was known that Bosnia did not need the robust 
military help as much as it needed administrative and civilian guidance. Therefore it can be 
argued that EUFOR took over the when the need for military presence was diminishing and 
EUPM was stepping in at the very beginning of Bosnia’s road towards being a sustainable 
country. The goals of the EUPM were clearly more advanced than those of EUFOR. It’s a 
pity, especially since in the case of the EU “the military component is far better established 
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that the civilian one.”360 This is partially due to the fact that civilian crisis management con-
cept is much younger than the military one. Additionally, in regards to its EUFOR Althea 
mission Brussels was able to draw on NATO’s experiences. It also learned from its previous 
mission – Concordia in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Artemis in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Moreover EUFOR Althea had better trained personal 
than EUPM. Finally, with the 2005 Seven Principles EUFOR became subordinated to EUPM 
and its possibilities to act outside civilian control had been significantly reduced. 
 Taking into consideration all of the above aspects one can argue that EUFOR’s suc-
cess was not due to that fact that it was better prepared to take over the assigned responsibili-
ties than EUPM, but rather because its goals were quite limited. As much as this is true, it is 
important to remember that part of  such a mission, whether civilian or military, is addressing 
the problem and evaluating, as precisely as possible, the missions strength and capabilities to 
solve it. Part of EUFOR’s success are in its responsibly assigned duties. EUPM on the other 
hand was charged with a mission that was definitely beyond EU civilian crisis management 
capabilities.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
On a grand scale the aim of the European Union’s presence in Bosnia was to assist the 
country with physical, political and social reconstruction, to help it became sustainable and 
secure and consequently bring it closer to the European Union. In order to achieve its goals 
Brussels deployed in Bosnia a whole range of  tools from as economic assistance to  crisis 
management instruments . As the Council of the European Union stated in its “European Se-
curity Strategy: Bosnia and Herzegovina/Comprehensive Policy” adopted in 2004, “all EU 
actors/instruments, whether political, military, police-related or economic, will contribute to 
implementing this overall EU policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina.”361 Thus, as both 
EUPM and EUFOR were parts of the EU’s “complex plan for Bosnia”, their performance 
should be judged in a context of EU overall presence in the country.  
Unfortunately, after nine years of European assistance, Bosnia and Herzegovina as a 
state is anything but sustainable. It seems that the country can serve as a perfect example of 
what Chrisopher Hill called in 1993 a ‘capability – expectation gap’. In Hill’s opinion there 
was a huge discrepancy between what European Union was suggesting it can do and what it 
was really able to achieve.
362
 The case of EUPM’s presence in Bosnia is a perfect illustration 
of this problem. As it was presented earlier in this study, when deployed on the ground, the 
EU police mission was not ready to handle the difficult political and social situation in Bos-
nia. It lacked almost everything, from a general idea of what it should be and how it should 
implement its goals to well trained and suitable for the job officers. It was unable to reform 
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the Bosnian police, tackle corruption or seriously affect organized crime. Unfortunately, the 
failure of the mission was mostly hurtful not to the European Union, but to Bosnia itself. The 
weak mandate of EUPM and its even weaker interpretation, the lack of experts among 
EUPM’s staff, language barriers and double standards taught Bosnia’s authorities that the EU 
was incapable of maintaining its own mission, and thus, even less capable of influencing any 
serious changes in Bosnia. For those who opposed the EU’s reforms, with Bosnian Serbs rep-
resented by Milorad Dodik being the most vigorous adversary, the EU incompetency was 
enough to hinder the whole process. In case of the police reform, the EU’s lack of a carefully 
thought-out plan that would satisfy both Brussels and Bosnia, led to a situation in which it 
was the Bosnians who dictated the rules and the EU who was adapting to them. As Bedrudin  
Brljavac points out, “a number of local politicians re-modified the European standards in line 
with their ‘Bosnian standards’ built in particularistic ideological interests.”363 In case of police 
reform the result of this process was especially distressing - when the agreement was finally 
reached it had almost no value.  
Due to the low standards of the EUPM mission, the EU lost a lot of credibility within 
Bosnian society. As presented throughout the study European officers were perceived as a 
laughing stock and their achievements minimal. On the other hand EUFOR, although better 
managed than the civilian crisis management mission, proved to be too liberal in the interpre-
tation of its mandate. This meant in practice that at the early stage of the mission its com-
mander, David Leakey, was acting on his own, individually deciding how to approach and 
solve problems. There is no one else to blame for this situation than Brussels, which was una-
ble to give Leakey any other tips on how to conduct the mission despite making it new and 
distinct. This situation confirmed Bosnians in the belief that the EU is a weak player, unable 
to control its own personnel.  
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The nine years of EU involvement in Bosnia, instead of contributing to a serious trans-
formation of the country, taught the Bosnian politicians how to manipulate the European Un-
ion in order to receive financial support without really meeting Brussels’ requirements. Most 
of the scholars specializing in crisis management operations warn that a wrongly conducted 
mission can easily push a country into more troubles than help it. Recchia, for example, ar-
gues that “the longer international control over the domestic political process in a post war 
society actually lasts, the more it risks undermining local political ownership and responsibil-
ity.”364 Sadly it seems that it is the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The European Union 
treated the country as its training field. It took Brussels two years, from 2004 to 2006, to solve 
the disagreements between EUPM and EUFOR over the missions’ competencies. From Brus-
sels’ perspective those were only two years, which helped the European Union to improve its 
crisis management concept. From Bosnia’s perspective those were crucial years. Not only 
because they could have been devoted to solving some of the country’s problems, but most 
notably because those were first years of the EU presence in Bosnia and thus, Bosnians were 
learning how they should perceive the European Union. Unfortunately, Brussels presented 
itself more as a baby in the woods than an experienced and strong player. 
It is also important to mention that it took the EU a long time to agree on how it 
should conduct its civilian and military crisis operations. Although most scholars argue that 
“the cooperation and coordination between civilian and military organizations is a crucial fac-
tor for the success of crisis management operation”, throughout most of its presence in Bosnia 
the EU was not able to coordinate its missions.
365
 In 2002, before deploying its police mission 
in Bosnia Brussels developed a concept of civil-military coordination CIMIC, which “referred 
to a cooperation among actors on the ground.”366 In other words, CIMIC was aimed at regu-
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lating the relationship between civilian and crisis management components when already de-
ployed in the country of interest.
367
 Yet, predictably the EU quickly understood that, having 
ambitions to be an civilian and military player able to provide whole range of instruments, it 
needed more advanced tools than CIMIC. Thus, it decided to further developed a concept of 
Civil Military Cooperation CMCO, which was supposed to provide an “effective coordination 
of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementa-
tion of EU’s response to the crisis”368 Although the CMCO concept was first mentioned in the 
EU documents already in 2001, it was not before 2006 that Brussels made a concrete proposal 
how to ensure the cooperation on the tactical and institutional level.
369
 The aim of CMCO was 
to help to “make policies, instruments and institutions work in an efficient and organized 
way.”370 Despite the obvious advantages of the development of the concept for the EU, the 
only thing that Bosnia gained from this process was the knowledge that when Brussels first 
sent its people to Bosnia it was not ready for a such a complex operation. 
Surely, criticism always comes easier than the praise. Bosnia’s political, social and 
economic situation was in 2004, and still is in 2012, extremely difficult. There is no easy so-
lution for the country’s problems. Yet, it can be argued that the European Union crisis man-
agement missions, if better prepared and conducted, could have been more successful. This 
verdict especially applies to the civilian mission. As Brljavac argued in 2011, “if the EU does 
not define clearly and openly what it expects from the Bosnian government then the Bosnian 
politicians will understand the EU standards and criteria as they wish. Paradoxically, but they 
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will see the EU as a community allowing development of divided ethno-nationalist communi-
ties.”371 In July 2012, when the EU Police Mission in Bosnia has been already terminated and 
the EUFOR Althea mission is also slowly coming to its end, Brljavac’s words not sound as a 
warning any more, but rather as a statement. EUPM left Bosnia ethnically divided, lacking 
reformed police forces, unable to amend the constitution and unprepared not only to join EU, 
but more notably to agree with the reforms Brussels’ proposes. The fact that EUFOR’s pres-
ence in the country was more successful offers little consolation. After all, its main goal was 
to secure the peace by simply being present. The EU should not probably use EUPM and 
EUFOR as its model crisis management missions. Yet, sadly, it will be easier for the EU than 
for Bosnia to forget Brussels’ questionable success in the country. 
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